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Law school faculty personnel decisions are often controversial.  Debates may be heated, 
votes may be close, and ill will may be incurred.  One way to avoid this enmity and to promote 
or maintain a collegial atmosphere is to vote by secret ballot on hiring, retention, promotion, and 
tenure questions.  The use of secret ballots, however, allows for the possibility of voting for the 
wrong reasons (e.g., bias, discrimination).  But open voting allows for the same possibility (e.g., 
political correctness, fear of reprisals). 
 
This Article discusses the evolution and significance of the secret ballot and considers the 
arguments for and against their use on law school faculties.  It also presents the results of an 
original survey (with a 97% response rate) on the use of secret ballots in faculty personnel 
decisions at all law schools in the United States.  Comments from the survey and conversations 
and email exchanges between the author and faculty and administrators across the country reveal 
a subtext that involves, among other things, candor, openness, fairness, and sensitivity, on the 
one hand, as well as politics, frustration, anger, power, dominance, and control, on the other 
hand. 
 
The Article concludes that, with secret ballotsCor, at the very least, with an open and 
honest debate about whether to conduct secret ballotsCmay come not only candor, but also 
greater harmony and collegiality. 
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“Article 21 of the Universal Declaration [of Human Rights] provides for 
‘periodic and genuine elections . . . by universal and equal suffrage and . . . by 
secret vote’ as the only process by which democracy can be attained.”1
PREFACE 
This Article began as an exercise in self-education.  At a faculty meeting in the recent 
past, my colleagues at American University, Washington College of Law, were preparing to vote 
on a slate of candidates that had been recommended to the faculty by our appointments 
committee.  Because the discussion on some matters had become heated, a tenured faculty 
member moved for a secret ballot on the committee’s recommendation.  The main argument 
offered in favor, by the movant and others, was that, for the protection of untenured professors 
(who have equal votes with tenured professors on questions of hiring new faculty), neither their 
senior colleagues nor the Dean should be permitted to know how they voted.  The ensuing 
discussion on whether to hold a secret ballot was no less heated than the original discussion on 
the committee’s recommendation had been.  The secret ballot motion was never put to a vote.  
An open vote on the recommended slate followed. 
 I left the meeting thinking that something had gone awry, and decided to do some library 
and empirical/anecdotal research on the importance and prevalence of secret ballots in law 
 
1 Reginald Ezetah, The Right to Democracy: A Qualitative Inquiry, 22 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 495, 516 (1997) (quoting 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., pt. 1, 183d plen. mtg. 
U.N. Doc. A/810, art. 21(3) (Dec. 10, 1948)). 
5school faculty personnel decision-making.  As the reader can see, the literature on secret ballots 
in academic decision-making was relatively sparse, but still easy enough to locate and to present.  
For the empirical/anecdotal research, I decided early on simply to poll the law schools in the 
Washington, D.C. vicinity (from Northern Virginia to Baltimore) to determine what their 
practices were and to report the results in a memorandum to my colleagues.  I fully expected, 
perhaps naively, to find that all of the schools used secret ballots—particularly when requested 
by a member of the voting faculty—for faculty hiring, retention, promotion, and tenure 
decisions, and that we were the outlier.  But I did not find that uniformity (would all law schools 
ever be uniform about anything?).  Rather, I  learned that, while most, but not all, of the schools I 
had contacted used secret ballots for faculty personnel matters, there were many variations 
regarding secret ballot procedures themselves.  So instead of writing a memo to my colleagues 
based on this limited sample, I decided to contact administrators and professors at all 168 AALS 
member law schools in the United States and 22 of the 23 AALS non-member fee-paid law 
schools.2
I emailed a brief questionnaire, asking about each law school’s voting practices on 
faculty personnel matters.3 A majority of the recipients of the questionnaire responded.  After 
reviewing the responses and drafting an early version of this paper, I requested permission from 
 
2 The one non-member school that I did not contact was The Judge Advocate General’s School of the U.S. Army, as 
the school “conducts [only] a graduate legal education program.”  See 
http://www.jagcnet.army.mil/JAGCNETINTERNET/HOMEPAGES/AC/TJAGSAWEB.NSF/Main?OpenFrameset 
(last visited Apr. 21, 2006). 
3 I asked the following questions:  (1) Does your school ever use a secret ballot in making faculty hiring, retention, 
promotion, and/or tenure decisions?; (2) If so, does a faculty member have to request a secret ballot, or is it 
automatic?; (3) Do you use secret ballots for any other matters?; (4) If so, does a faculty member have to request a 
secret ballot, or is it automatic?; (5) Does your school have a written policy regarding open vs. secret ballots?  (If so, 
may I review a copy of the policy statement or the provision of the law school or university manual?); (6) If your 
school allows a secret ballot for faculty personnel (or other) decisions, would you say that this process has been 
more productive or more counter-productive? Why? [Would you please share any anecdotes to illustrate your 
conclusion?]; and (7) If your school does not allow a secret ballot for faculty personnel (or other) decisions, would 
you say that this process has been more productive or more counter-productive? Why? [Would you please share any 
anecdotes to illustrate your conclusion?] 
6all respondents whose language I was interested in quoting.  As I describe later in this Article, 
the responses showed many variations in voting policies and practices.  This should not be 
surprising, however, for there were many variations even in responses to my request for 
permission to quote.  Deans and faculty across the country fell into four groups regarding that 
request:  (1) permission granted, with attribution to both the respondent and the law school; (2) 
permission granted, with anonymity for the respondent, but not for the law school; (3) 
permission granted, with anonymity for both the individual and the school; and (4) permission 
denied.4 This last category struck me as a bit odd—not because some respondents did not want 
me to quote their personal opinions, which is perfectly understandable, but because some of them 
did not want to be quoted even regarding the (I thought) straight-forward question of whether or 
not their schools used secret or open ballots.  And then there was the irresistible irony:  some 
respondents who advocated open ballots—primarily to hold individuals answerable for their 
positions—declined to allow use of their names in this Article.5
Sometime during the drafting of the Article, I decided that I needed more specific 
information than the original questionnaire had elicited.  I sent a second questionnaire to deans 
and faculty asking—in the categories of hiring, retention, promotion, tenure, and dean 
selection—whether the school used secret ballots; whether the ballots were completely secret, or 
instead whether faculty members had to sign the ballot or provide reasons; and whether use of 
the secret ballot was automatic or had to be requested.  I also asked whether the school used 
secret ballots for any other purposes.  After several requests with follow-up emails, to my 
 
4 I use different citation forms for the different categories—except, of course, for the fourth category, from which I 
did not quote at all. 
5 Nevertheless, I am exceedingly grateful to all faculty and administrators who took the time to think about and 
respond to my questionnaire, whichever category they fell into.  This Article would have been impossible to write 
without their participation and (usually) cooperation. 
7delight, if not outright astonishment, I received replies from 165 (of 168) AALS member schools 
and 20 (of 22) non-member schools—for a 97% response rate.6
What began as a one-month assignment to myself turned out to be a year-long project.  
Undoubtedly this Article will not be the final word on the use of secret ballots for law school 
faculty personnel decisions.  Perhaps other researchers will gather more detailed information in 
the future.  And perhaps they will parse that information differently and find and emphasize 
other nuances.  The results of this project, however, answered my initial query about the 
prevalence of secret ballots.  Perhaps equally important, the email exchanges and conversations I 
had with faculty and administrators across the country reveal a subtext that involves, among 
other things, candor, collegiality, openness, fairness, and sensitivity, on the one hand, as well as 
politics, frustration, anger, power, dominance, and control, on the other hand.   
INTRODUCTION 
One of the most important ingredients in a democracy is the secret ballot.7 A true 
democracy emphasizes the will of the people,8 and secret voting ensures this touchstone.9
Today, the United States government guarantees “[e]very American . . . the right to a secret 
 
6 I summarize the responses later in the Article.  See infra Part III.B (describing numerical results); Appendix A 
(“Numerical Summary”); Appendix B (“Use of Secret Ballots in Law School Faculty Personnel Decisions:  School 
by School Tabulations”); Appendix C (“Comments and Other Uses”). 
7 See Julia A. Wentz, Comment, Balancing Academic Freedom and Civil Rights: Toward an Appropriate Privilege 
for the Votes of Academic Peer Review Committees, 68 IOWA L. REV. 585, 593-94 (1983) (noting that the Advisory 
Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence recognizes “that secret voting is essential to democratic government 
and that the right to vote secretly would be meaningless if disclosure could be compelled after the ballot had been 
cast”); see also Andrew Coleman & Jackson Maogoto, Democracy’s Global Quest: A Noble Crusade Wrapped in 
Dirty Reality?, 28 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 175, 196 (2005) (acknowledging the secret ballot as a key 
criterion for free and fair elections). 
8 See Ezetah, supra note 1, at 514-15 (arguing that a government is not democratic unless it is based on the consent 
of the governed).   
9 See, e.g., Saul Levmore, Law, Economics, & Norms: The Anonymity Tool, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2191, 2219-20 
(1996) (stating that the secret ballot has essentially become a “universal human ‘right’ ” and should become a legal 
norm in all democratic societies); Erik Van Hagen, Note, The Not-So-Secret Ballot: How Washington Fails to 
Provide a Secret Vote for Impaired Voters as Required by the Washington State Constitution, 80 WASH. L. REV.
787, 787 (2005) (asserting that a secret vote represents the true will of the people because they do not have to fear 
reprisal for their views). 
8ballot so that no one—not husband or wife, not parents, not employer . . . knows how a voter 
votes.”10 This secrecy enables citizens to express their private opinions freely, without infliction 
of even the subtlest influence,11 and without fearing reprisal from those who vote or think 
differently.12 
Just as our nation seeks to protect the unfettered will of its citizens in choosing political 
leaders, many universities also follow this democratic tradition.  University faculty members 
have a professional responsibility to evaluate their peers and participate in academic 
governance.13 Although faculty do not have a constitutional right to a secret ballot when they 
make hiring, retention, promotion, and tenure decisions, many schools recognize the importance 
of truthfulness and conscientiousness in these evaluations and, therefore, generally have 
professors cast secret ballots for these critical faculty personnel determinations.14 The academic 
community, represented by well-respected organizations such as the American Association of 
 
10 Bernice Powell Jackson, Protecting the Secret Ballot, WITNESS FOR JUSTICE, Sept. 27, 2004, 
http://www.ucc.org/justice/witness/wfj092704.htm.   
11 See Van Hagen, supra note 11, at 787-88 (“The purpose of a secret vote is to counteract a great class of evils, 
including . . . the fear of ridicule and dislike, or of social or commercial injury—all coercive influence of every sort 
depending on a knowledge of the voter’s political action.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  
12 Id.  
13 See NEIL HAMILTON, ZEALOTRY AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM 159 (1995) (arguing that professional academic 
freedom requires university faculty members to review their peers and that this system of self-governance is unique 
to academia). 
14 See Michael L. Seigel, On Collegiality, 54 J. LEGAL EDUC. 406, 416 (2004) (emphasizing that universities tend to 
govern themselves based on democratic principles); E-mail from Dennis Arrow, Professor of Law, Oklahoma City 
University School of Law, to Adrienne Belyea, Washington College of Law (Oct. 13, 2005, 09:01:18 EST) (on file 
with author) (“To most of us, I believe, [the unvarying rule mandating the secret ballot for personnel decisions is] 
congruent with the ‘secret ballot’ premises of the American electoral system, and in my own judgment (and, I 
believe, that of most of my colleagues), the rule has been productive (even where I and/or any of my colleagues 
have personally disagreed with the result).”).  See also Association of American Law Schools, Report of the AALS 
Special Committee on Tenure and the Tenuring Process, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 477, 499 (1992) (recognizing that many 
law schools have the secret ballot in place to “encourage honest votes and [to] help eliminate ‘back scratching’ and 
fear”).  See infra Part III.B (discussing results of primary research conducted by the author); Appendix A; Appendix 
B; Appendix C.  But see University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 200 (1990) (stating that 
“confidentiality is not the norm in all peer review systems” (citing G. Bednash, The Relationship Between Access 
and Selectivity in Tenure Review Outcomes (1989) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Maryland)). 
9University Professors (AAUP),15 the American Council on Education (ACE),16 and the National 
Commission on Issues in Higher Education,17 recommends this level of confidentiality to 
encourage candor and to facilitate selection of the most qualified candidates.   
 While some critics argue that the secret ballot impedes faculty self-governance decisions 
by not holding professors accountable for their votes,18 this Article contends that law schools can 
implement mechanisms to discourage professors from voting with improper motives.  Further, it 
argues that all law schools should use a strict or modified secret ballot system for faculty hiring, 
retention, promotion, and tenure decisions because the secret ballot best ensures that professors 
cast votes on academic grounds, and not out of fear of reprisal from the administration or their 
colleagues.  A confidential vote also facilitates a greater exchange of ideas among the faculty by 
breaking down political factions and decreasing disharmony—two essential goals at many law 
schools today.  In this Article, I discuss the evolution and significance of the secret ballot.  I also  
briefly examine academic freedom and its impact on academic governance.  I address why a 
secret ballot is the superior voting method for making faculty personnel decisions.  I then survey  
the voting practices of law schools in the United States.19 I conclude that a secret ballot or a 
 
15 See Association of American Professors, A Preliminary Statement on Judicially Compelled Disclosures in the 
Nonrenewal of Faculty Appointments, 67 ACADEME 27, 27 (1981) (stating that the AAUP guidelines maintain a 
presumption of confidentiality unless the “facts and circumstances raise a sufficient inference that some 
impermissible consideration was likely to have played a role” in the non-renewal decision).  
16 See John A. Gray, Confidentiality of Faculty Peer Review in the Tenure Process, 11 EDUC. LAW REP. 11, 25-26 
(1983) (quoting an ACE report that concluded, “[M]ost educators believe that confidentiality encourages candor and 
openness in the evaluation of individuals under review and therefore is crucial to that process: Confidentiality can 
strengthen professional equity of treatment as distinct from results achieved through favoritism or popularity . . . . 
Confidentiality can promote intellectual excellence, when it allows candor without injury to feeling.”) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  
17 See Summary Recommendations, National Commission on Higher Education Issues, To Strengthen Quality in 
Higher Education 9 (Nov. 1982) (“[I]n the evaluation of faculty members, confidentiality is essential to frank and 
candid assessments of professional qualifications.”).  
18 See infra Part II.A.3 (discussing critiques of the secret ballot system). 
19 See supra notes 2-6 and accompanying text (describing research method).  Since there is no cognizable difference 
between the necessity for a secret ballot in the law school and the broader university settings, the compiled law 
school results also reflect the trends and concerns of university governance.  The responses from law school faculty 
and administrators thus are interspersed throughout the Article, as well as in Part III.A infra.
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variant thereof allows the faculty to vote their true sentiments—thus enhancing the quality of the 
faculty, generating a more enriched dialogue among them, and improving legal education and its 
impact on our society. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
A.  Evolution of the Secret Ballot as a Key Ingredient to Democracy 
 The official secret ballot system, also known as the Australian ballot,20 was an election 
process created in Australia during the 1850s.21 Australia adopted this system to end the bribery 
and chaos that surrounded their elections.22 Pursuant to this process, a voter received a ballot 
paper and retreated to a private, inner compartment to strike out the candidates whom he did not 
want to elect.23 Upon completing the ballot, the voter folded the paper and deposited it in a 
locked box guarded by officials so that the vote would remain anonymous.24 
Shortly after Australia introduced the secret ballot, politicians in the United States began 
to campaign for its adoption in the American electoral system.25 Corruption, intimidation, and 
bribery infused nineteenth-century America’s open voting system.26 Groups of drunk or armed 
men traveled to various voting stations on Election Day and overtly disclosed their votes in the 
presence of awaiting voters to intimidate them into casting their ballots for a particular 
 
20 See LIONEL E. FREDMAN, THE AUSTRALIAN BALLOT: THE STORY OF AN AMERICAN REFORM 4 (East Lansing, 
1968) (recognizing that the two terms are interchangeable).   
21 See id. at 7 (explaining that William Nicholson, a former Mayor of Melbourne, Australia, drafted the secret ballot 
provisions that the legislature included in the Electoral Act passed on March 19, 1856; Nicholson is known as the 
“father of the [secret] ballot”).   
22 Id. at 10.   
23 See id. at 8-9 (indicating that South Australia eventually replaced this method with a process whereby the voter 
marked a cross within a square next to the name of the candidate for whom he chose to vote).  The United States 
adopted this process rather than the system of striking out names.  Id. at 9.   
24 See id. at 9 (stating that officials endorsed strict guidelines that prevented anyone from leaving the room with any 
papers, to ensure that an individual’s vote remained private).   
25 See infra text notes 30-34 and accompanying text (discussing how the American electoral process transitioned 
from a system in which citizens cast open votes to one in which they cast secret ballots). 
26 See infra text accompanying notes 26-29 (explaining that corruption and intimidation infused the American 
electoral process before the implementation of the secret ballot system). 
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candidate.27 In addition, candidates engaged in corrupt tactics, such as vote-buying.28 
Supporters of the secret ballot hoped that it would substantially reduce the influence of money 
and power in the election process and ensure the honest, considered vote of the people.29 
In 1888, advocates of the Australian ballot persuaded the State of Massachusetts to 
implement the first secret ballot system in the United States.30 During the next half-century, all 
of the states adopted the secret ballot, culminating in 1950 when South Carolina was the final 
state to approve that form of voting.31 Since then, voters have been able to cast their ballots in 
private without having any obligation to party leaders, even if they engaged in “implicit vote 
contract[s].”32 Among other things, the secret ballot discouraged candidates and party leaders 
from engaging in vote-buying, because they were no longer able to “monitor the voters’ 
actions.”33 Commentators consider the adoption of the secret ballot system to be “one of the 
greatest gains for democracy in America,” because it eliminated the disruptive voting practices 
present in the open voting process.34 
B.  Academic Freedom:  Shielding Professors from Unfair Influence 
27 Richard M. Valelly, The Changing Shape of the American Electorate: Suffrage Laws and Turnout, in AMERICAN 
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS AND ELECTIONS 9, 14 (William G. Shade & Ballard C. Campbell eds., Sharpe Reference 
2003). 
28 See Jack Hitt, Real Campaign-Finance Reform, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 1999, at § 6 (Magazine), p. 36 (describing 
the process whereby party bosses bought voters and “drove them to the voting stations like cattle”).  The bosses 
further reinforced their purchases by forcing the voters to waive above their heads the colored ballots indicating the 
candidate for whom they had voted.  Id.  
29 Valelly, supra note 27, at 14. 
30 See Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 266 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (discussing how the 
government did not adequately protect secrecy in the electoral system until it adopted the Australian ballot in 1888).  
31 See Hitt, supra note 28, at 36 (discussing that vote-buying in American elections finally came to an end in 1950, 
when all of the states formally adopted the secret ballot). 
32 See Jac C. Heckelman, Revisiting the Relationship Between Secret Ballots and Turnout: A New Test of Two Legal-
Institutional Theories, 28 AM. POL. Q. 194, 195 (2000) (stating that, since party leaders could not determine which 
candidate a person voted for, even if the person agreed beforehand to vote for a specific candidate, the party leaders 
could not enforce these agreements). 
33 Id. 
34 Valelly, supra note 27, at 14.  But see FREDMAN, supra note 20, at 10 (suggesting that the secret ballot system was 
not flawless).  Party agents were still able to engage in a discreet vote-buying process where voters were sent in one 
at a time, and the first voter deposited a blank vote and returned with the actual ballot.  Id.  The agent filled out the 
ballot and presented it to the next voter in line, who deposited that vote in the box and returned with another unfilled 
ballot.  Id.  The agent then paid the voter and the process continued.  Id.   
12
Courts and commentators have recognized the importance of shielding citizens’ thoughts 
and expressions from government intrusion not only in the political arena, but also in the 
academic realm.  Universities play a unique and critical role in society by advancing ideas,35 
providing expert advice to civic leaders,36 and training our nation’s youth.37 To allow the 
academy to excel in these responsibilities, the Supreme Court has recognized that, like our 
nation’s electorate, professors need constitutional protection from government and societal 
influence as they embark on these vital duties.38 Thus, the Supreme Court has held that the First 
and Fourteenth Amendments provide both universities and individual professors the right to 
express ideas freely without government intrusion or distrust.39 Justice Frankfurter, in a 
concurring opinion, articulated this concept of constitutional academic freedom as allowing all 
universities to decide “on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be 
taught, and who may be admitted to study.”40 
Many scholars have argued that a constitutionally-based academic freedom protects 
faculty members both from the arbitrary influence of the government and from potential coercion 
by university administrators.41 But the Supreme Court rejected this position in University of 
 
35 See Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (referring to universities as the “marketplace of 
ideas”) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted); Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 250 (maintaining that scholarship will 
not flourish and society will not advance unless professors and students can freely study, evaluate, inquire, and 
understand issues without outside influence). 
36 See American Association of University Professors, The 1915 General Declaration of Principles 155, 158 (1915), 
reprinted in HAMILTON, supra note 13, app. A, at 368. 
37 See Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 250 (“No one should underestimate the vital role in a democracy that is played by those 
who guide and train our youth.”). 
38 See, e.g., Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603 (stating that the First Amendment protects academic institutions from laws 
that inhibit the flow of ideas or that seek to broadly regulate academic institutions). 
39 See Betsey Nathan, The Second Circuit Strikes a Balance Between Academic Freedom and Individual 
Employment Rights: Gray v. Board of Higher Education, 50 BROOK. L. REV. 627, 644 (1984) (describing  the nexus 
that the Supreme Court developed between the First Amendment and academic freedom over a period of ten years in 
the context of government accusations of communist activities in American universities). 
40 Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 263 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (quoting The Open Universities in South Africa 10-12). 
41 See, e.g., James H. Brooks, Confidentiality of Tenure Review and Discovery of Peer Review Materials, 1988 BYU  
L. REV. 705, 711 (1988) (asserting that academic freedom protects professors’ “who may teach” decisions from both 
the influence of the administration and forces outside the institution). 
13
Pennsylvania v. EEOC,42 in which it clarified that constitutional academic freedom protects 
professors only against government coercion and not against intrusive administrators.43 While 
the Constitution does not protect faculty members from the influence of university administrators 
and boards of trustees, professional academic freedom does.  Specifically, it protects faculty 
members from employer interference with “research, teaching, and intramural and extramural 
utterance.” 44 Faculty formed the AAUP in 1915 to contest university interference with 
individual professors’ free speech rights;45 the organization has provided professors with the 
“exceptional vocational freedom to inquire, to teach, and to publish without [administrative] 
interference.”46 
Faculty self-governance and peer review are indispensable components of the tradition of 
academic freedom that exists in our country.47 Faculty members have a professional and ethical 
duty to ensure that universities hire, retain, promote, and tenure only those professors who are 
dedicated to advancing knowledge both inside and outside of the classroom.48 A sound process 
to evaluate new hires and probationary faculty is critical, because it has a direct impact on the 
quality of an academic institution and in turn on the intellectual growth of the larger society.49 
Although professional academic freedom does not categorically require confidentiality in this 
 
42 493 U.S. 182 (1990) (holding that the First Amendment only protects universities and professors from direct 
government control over the content of university speech).  
43See HAMILTON, supra note 13, at 187 (contending that the Supreme Court made it clear in University of 
Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 200 (1990), that the Constitution does not protect individual faculty members 
from administrative interference). 
44 See id. (stating that, unlike constitutional academic freedom, professional academic freedom protects faculty from 
university administrators interfering with their scholarship, speech, and teaching).  
45 See id. at 159 (explaining that professors formed the AAUP at the turn of the century when universities were 
interfering with professors’ abilities to speak freely). 
46 Id. 
47 See id. at 163 (maintaining that academic freedom requires faculty self-governance because only professors can 
evaluate the professional qualifications that are necessary to promote intellectual inquiry and scholarship). 
48 See id. (noting that academic freedom places a corresponding duty on professors to govern themselves and to 
promote academic freedom). 
49 See Gray, supra note 12, at 16 (arguing that, since the “quality of a college is directly dependent on the quality of 
its faculty, tenure decisions are the most important decisions made each year at institutions of higher education”). 
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decision-making process, many professional associations50 and writers51 recommend 
confidentiality to ensure candor and to guarantee that professors make personnel decisions on 
academic grounds, and not based on fear of reprisal from the administration or other faculty 
members.  Many institutions of higher education have heeded these recommendations and use a 
secret ballot system in personnel and other academic governance decisions.52 
II.  BENEFITS OF THE SECRET BALLOT SYSTEM IN FACULTY PERSONNEL DECISIONS 
Determining “who may teach” is arguably the most important issue protected by 
academic freedom and the most critical matter on which university faculty members vote.53 
50 See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text (explaining that the AAUP, the ACE, and the National Commission 
on Issues in Higher Education all recommend using the secret ballot to encourage candor when making faculty 
hiring and retention decisions). 
51 See, e.g., Don Mark North, Note, University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC: The Denial of an Academic Freedom 
Privilege, 18 PEPP. L. REV. 213, 242-43 (1990) (discussing the negative implications of an open voting system on 
the tenure review process); E-mail from Ronald Chen, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, Rutgers University 
School of Law-Newark, to Adrienne Belyea, Washington College of Law (Sept. 16, 2005, 13:52:56 EST) (on file 
with author) (“I can’t imagine that we would ever use a[n] [open] ballot for a faculty personnel decision.”).  But see 
E-mail from Lawrence Cunningham, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, Boston College Law School, to 
Adrienne Belyea, Washington College of Law (Oct. 9, 2005, 21:15:42 EST) (on file with author) (“[Using the secret 
ballot] is fine; I doubt any outcome of votes I’ve been involved with would have changed.”); E-mail from Richard 
Daynard, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, Northeastern University School of Law, to Adrienne Belyea, 
Washington College of Law (Sept. 16, 2005, 14:28:45 EST) (on file with author) (“I don't think [using the secret 
ballot] has made much difference since it was instituted a few years ago.”); E-mail from Philip Lacy, Associate 
Dean for Academic Affairs, University of South Carolina School of Law, to Adrienne Belyea, Washington College 
of Law (Oct. 12, 2005, 19:26:01 EST) (on file with author) (“I doubt that [the secret ballot] had any impact on either 
the outcome of the votes or the welfare of the faculty.”); E-mail from Lawrence Moore, Associate Dean for 
Academic Affairs, Loyola University New Orleans School of Law, to Adrienne Belyea, Washington College of Law 
(Oct. 11, 2005, 12:46:59 EST) (on file with author) (“Overall I doubt whether [a secret ballot] makes much 
difference in the outcome.  At most one or two votes change if they are public.”); E-mail from Marshall Tracht, Vice 
Dean, Hofstra University School of Law, to Adrienne Belyea, Washington College of Law (Oct. 11, 2005, 12:23:37 
EST) (on file with author) (“[I]f we did not use [a] secret ballot I don’t think it would make much difference.”). 
52 See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
53 See Association of American Law Schools, supra note 14, at 477 (stating that “[f]aculty renewal is one of the 
most important responsibilities of the law school.  The future quality of the institution depends on the care that is 
devoted to the initial recruitment of new faculty”).  For instance, Dean Warner Lawson of Howard University 
School of Law stated, “I have been at Howard for 31 years and I have always believed that the vote to hire new 
faculty is the most important decision the faculty makes.”  E-mail from Warner Lawson, Associate Dean for 
Academic Affairs, Howard University School of Law, to Ira P. Robbins, Washington College of Law (Dec. 7, 2005, 
18:51:46 EST) (on file with author).  The importance of personnel matters in academic governance is illustrated by 
the practices of many schools that have an open ballot policy for all other issues except hiring, promotion, or tenure 
decisions.  See E-mail from Joan Howarth, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, University of Nevada Las Vegas, 
William S. Boyd School of Law, to Adrienne Belyea, Washington College of Law (Oct. 10, 2005, 07:27:31 EST) 
(on file with author) (“The pertinent portion of our by-laws provides as follows:  Voting will be by voice or by show 
of hands . . . except in personnel matters . . . .  In such cases, the vote will be taken by ballot, with the ballots to be 
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After all, the quality of a university is highly dependent on the quality of its faculty.54 Professors 
drive the flow of ideas both within the classroom and in our society.  Further, tenure is a 
monumental contractual obligation for a university.55 It results in a substantial commitment of 
university resources to a professor, often for thirty or more years.56 It is therefore critical for a 
university to ensure to the greatest extent possible that it hires and tenures only to the most 
qualified, effective, and productive individuals.57 
Faculty members are heavily involved in deciding who may teach.58 Frequently, the dean 
appoints or the faculty elects committees or subcommittees to recommend new appointments and 
 
counted at the meeting by the person designated by the presiding officer.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); E-
mail from Christine Manolakas, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School 
of Law, to Adrienne Belyea, Washington College of Law (Oct. 11, 2005, 18:28:58 EST) (on file with author) 
(“Although not technically automatic, a secret ballot is the tradition for both faculty hiring and promotion/tenure 
decisions.  I cannot remember a secret ballot being used for any other purpose in almost thirty years.”); E-mail from 
Lawrence Moore, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, Loyola University New Orleans School of Law, to 
Adrienne Belyea, Washington College of Law (Oct. 11, 2005, 12:46:59 EST) (on file with author) (“[The secret 
ballot is] automatic for personnel decisions, but otherwise must be requested.”). 
54 See supra note 49 and accompanying text (arguing that faculty hiring and retention decisions are the most 
important decisions made in institutions of higher learning because universities depend on the quality of their faculty 
for their success).   
55 Frank M. Baglione, Note, Title VII and the Tenure Decision: The Need for a Qualified Academic Freedom 
Privilege Protecting Confidential Peer Review Materials in University Employment Discrimination Cases, 21 
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 691, 702-03 (1987); see also Gray, supra note 16, at 11 (asserting that a university’s decision to 
grant a professor tenure is significant, because it bestows lifetime job security on that professor). 
56 See Gray, supra note 16, at 11 (assuming that most faculty members are tenured before the age of 35). 
57 Some law schools realize the consequences and commitment that granting tenure carry and possibly take it more 
seriously by requiring a secret ballot for tenure and promotion, but not for hiring decisions.  See E-mail from John 
Strait Applegate, Executive Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington, 
to Adrienne Belyea, Washington College of Law (Oct. 10, 2005, 08:28:16 EST) (on file with author) (“Yes [we use 
a secret ballot], but only for tenure decisions or hiring with tenure.”); E-mail from Chris Cameron, Associate Dean 
for Academic Affairs, Southwestern University School of Law, to Adrienne Belyea, Washington College of Law 
(Oct. 11, 2005, 10:38:51 EST) (on file with author) (“[We use the secret ballot only] for retention and promotion to 
tenure decisions.”); E-mail from Jethro Lieberman, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, New York Law School, to 
Adrienne Belyea, Washington College of Law (Sept. 16, 2005, 14:32:33 EST) (on file with author) (“No (or almost 
never) in faculty hiring decisions [do we use a secret ballot].  Yes (always) in tenure decisions.”); E-mail from 
Theresa Newman, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, Duke University School of Law, to Adrienne Belyea, 
Washington College of Law (Sept. 16, 2005, 12:03:29 EST) (on file with author) (“[The secret ballot] is automatic 
for tenure decisions, but has to be requested for other matters.”). 
58 See JAMES J. DUDERSTADT, Governing the Twenty-First-Century University, in COMPETING CONCEPTIONS OF 
ACADEMIC GOVERNANCE 137, 140 (William G. Tierney, ed., 2004) (recognizing that faculty involvement in the 
hiring process is both “effective and essential” for academic purposes). 
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to review and make recommendations on retention, promotion, and tenure,59 with the rest of the 
faculty (or only tenured faculty, for the promotion and tenure decisions) voting on committee  
recommendations.  The future of a school greatly depends on the committees’ best collective 
judgment and the remaining faculty members’ honest assessments of the candidates.  A 
confidential review process and a secret ballot system best promote this honesty by encouraging 
“candid, searching, and rigorous evaluations.”60 A secret ballot also alleviates the conflict and 
disharmony that often exist among faculty members or between faculty and the administration.61 
59 See id. (providing that multiple faculty committees exist within universities, including faculty hiring committees 
and faculty promotion or tenure committees).  
60 Gray, supra note 16, at 28.  Most educators agree that confidentiality promotes honesty and openness in the peer 
review process and therefore is crucial to maintaining that process effectively.  Id. at 25.  Confidentiality is 
necessary because it allows the university to treat all candidates equally by eliminating the influences of favoritism 
and popularity.  Id. Many law schools implement a secret ballot system for these reasons.  See, e.g., E-mail from M. 
Thomas Arnold, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, University of Tulsa College of Law, to Adrienne Belyea, 
Washington College of Law (Sept. 23, 2005, 15:25:29 EST) (on file with author) (“[One of the] advantages to the 
secret ballot [is that] people can truly vote their conscience.”); E-mail from Eric Gouvin, Associate Dean for 
Academic Affairs, Western New England College School of Law, to Adrienne Belyea, Washington College of Law 
(Sept. 16, 2005, 14:19:05 EST) (on file with author) (stating that the secret ballot is productive because “people tend 
to vote more honestly on the merits of the candidate”); E-mail from Shauna Marshall, Academic Dean, University of 
California, Hastings College of Law, to Adrienne Belyea, Washington College of Law (Sept. 17, 2005, 09:00:07 
EST) (on file with author) (“I believe [the secret ballot] has worked well.  I am sure, from time to time, there are 
members of the faculty who profess to support a candidate and then vote differently but that does not appear to 
outweigh the value of the secret ballot.”); E-mail from law school official who requested anonymity, to Adrienne 
Belyea, Washington College of Law (Oct. 12, 2005, 18:35:52 EST) (on file with author) (“With respect to hiring 
[and promotion and tenure] decisions, our rule reads:  ‘Voting . . . shall be by secret written ballot.  A faculty 
member, whose presence and participation have been by other means pursuant [our rule on proxy voting], may make 
arrangements to protect the anonymity of his or her vote to the extent feasible.’ ”); E-mail from Dayna Matthew, 
Associate Dean of Academic Affairs, University of Colorado School of Law, to Adrienne Belyea, Washington 
College of Law (Oct. 13, 2005, 16:33:41 EST) (on file with author) (“[The secret ballot is productive] because it 
encourages candor in [a] safe environment.”); E-mail from Martha Spence, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, 
Lewis & Clark Law School, to Adrienne Belyea, Washington College of Law, Dec. 8, 2005, 8:49:58 EST (on file 
with author) (“[Use of the secret ballot for faculty personnel decisions is] mostly productive in the same way that 
any voting should be secret—otherwise people might not feel free to vote their true views, but might vote 
‘politically’ or in response to pressure from certain colleagues.  Of course, with secret ballots, people can vote 
‘strategically,’ too, but in the 13 years I’ve been here, I think our process has worked very well and very fairly.”); E-
mail from law school official who requested anonymity, to Adrienne Belyea, Washington College of Law (Oct. 11, 
2005, 11:41:18 EST) (on file with author) (“[S]ecret ballots permit more truthful reflection [and] assessment than 
some might be willing to share in an open ballot.”).
61 See Seigel, supra note 14, at 416 (maintaining that many tenured professors on law school faculties view their 
dean as their equal, and therefore conflict occurs when they want to vote contrary to the dean’s opinion); E-mail 
from Michael S. Ariens, Associate Dean for Academic and Student Affairs, St. Mary’s University School of Law, to 
Adrienne Belyea, Washington College of Law (Sept. 16, 2005, 13:39:42 EST) (on file with author) (finding the 
secret ballot productive for faculty personnel decisions because “such decisions are fraught with interpersonal 
conflicts”); E-mail from M. Thomas Arnold, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, University of Tulsa College of 
Law, to Adrienne Belyea, Washington College of Law (Sept. 23, 2005, 15:25:29 EST) (on file with author) (“[One 
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A.  The Secret Ballot Encourages Faculty Candor and Eliminates the Chilling Effect 
 
A secret ballot voting system for personnel decisions greatly benefits both universities 
and society in general because it dispels the chilling effect that open voting systems have on 
faculty candor.62 An open voting system has the capacity to induce faculty members to refrain 
from voting; it also has the capacity to chill faculty from giving “honest, candid criticism of 
another in public because of the fear that in some way their comments will be misunderstood and 
misused by others in their community and because of the fear that in some undefined way there 
is the potential for some kind of reprisal against them.”63 As a result, personnel decisions made 
in an open voting system often do not reflect the faculty’s best collective judgment.64 
of the] advantages of the secret ballot [is that] it probably minimizes hard feelings after votes on very controversial 
issues.”); E-mail from D. Benjamin Beard, Associate Dean, University of Idaho College of Law, to Adrienne 
Belyea, Washington College of Law (Sept. 16, 2005, 09:11:31 EST) (on file with author) (“We have a small faculty. 
Voting outside of the ‘mainstream’ is generally more difficult in smaller groups—the secret ballot ameliorates some 
of that concern.”); E-mail from Kathleen Boozang, Associate Dean, Seton Hall University School of Law, to 
Adrienne Belyea, Washington College of Law (Oct. 13, 2005, 17:29:09 EST) (on file with author) (“[The secret 
ballot] is absolutely more productive.  It eliminates actual knowledge about who voted how, unless people speak 
before the vote, and diminishes hard feelings and gossip.”); E-mail from Ann Carlson, Academic Associate Dean, 
University of California at Los Angeles School of Law, to Adrienne Belyea, Washington College of Law (Sept. 16, 
2005, 09:07:13 EST) (on file with author) (“The upside [of the secret ballot] is that people can vote freely without 
fearing political ramifications.”); E-mail from Richard Daynard, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, Northeastern 
University School of Law, to Adrienne Belyea, Washington College of Law (Sept. 16, 2005, 14:28:45 EST) (on file 
with author) (“[F]olks feel more comfortable with [the secret ballot].”); E-mail from Carol Goforth, Associate Dean, 
University of Arkansas School of Law-Fayetteville, to Adrienne Belyea, Washington College of Law (Sept. 16, 
2005, 12:16:53 EST) (on file with author) (articulating her preference for secret ballot because it alleviates faculty 
“fear that negative votes will be reported back to the candidate, and might poison or harm future relationships”); E-
mail from W. Clark Williams, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, University of Richmond School of Law, to 
Adrienne Belyea, Washington College of Law (Sept. 16, 2005, 15:38:56 EST) (on file with author) (“[The secret 
ballot] reduces the chances of resentment or ill feelings that can come from such a significant decision.”); E-mail 
from law school official who requested anonymity, to Adrienne Belyea, Washington College of Law (Oct. 11, 2005, 
09:25:16 EST) (on file with author) (“Information about the faculty members who cast negative votes generally gets 
back to the person whose tenure or promotion is at issue, and this has resulted in some awkwardness and hard 
feelings.”).  But see E-mail from Charles W. Sorenson, Associate Dean, New England School of Law, to Adrienne 
Belyea, Washington College of Law (Sept. 16, 2005, 17:13:16 EST) (on file with author) (hypothesizing that the 
open ballot “tempered potential hyper critical faculty members and the tendency for personal animosity to affect 
votes”). 
62 North, supra note 51, at 216-18; see also John D. Copeland & John W. Murry, Jr., Getting Tossed From the Ivory 
Tower: The Legal Implications of Evaluating Faculty Performance, 61 MO. L. REV. 233, 312 (1996) (criticizing 
open voting systems because they restrict deliberations and prevent the “free and open exchange of opinions and 
information that is necessary to the deliberative process”). 
63 Gray, supra note 16, at 29; see Levmore, supra note 9, at 2222-23 (supporting the idea that open voting may be 
appropriate in social settings but not necessarily in a more formal environment such as a faculty meeting).  A 
common social setting includes the situation in which one asks a group where to go out to dinner or what movie to 
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1.  An Open Voting System Creates a Chilling Effect on Faculty Candor 
There are many reasons why faculty members may refrain from voting altogether or may 
vote contrary to their honestly held beliefs in an open voting system.  Open voting may dissuade 
professors who, for example, want to remain in the good graces of the dean from participating in 
the faculty selection or peer review process for fear that their opinions, no matter how legitimate, 
may be in opposition to the administration’s views, and therefore might lead to reprisals against 
them.65 The university setting is particularly democratic; while the dean may be primus inter 
pares, faculty members accentuate the pares and view themselves as nothing less than equals to 
the dean and faculty administrators.66 Open voting undermines this equality, however, by unduly 
empowering administrators.67 Since the dean controls the salary, committee assignments, and 
budgetary allotments for all faculty members—as well as course assignments and class 
schedules—many tenured faculty members may hesitate to disclose a vote that is contrary to the 
dean’s position.  This result is irreconcilable with the essence of academic freedom and 
 
see.  Id.  Obviously, a secret ballot vote in this situation would be ludicrous, “implying fear of reprisal among 
friends.”  Id.  However, it is not necessarily the case that all faculty members are friends.  Instead, among faculty, 
there are hierarchal relationships, differences between tenured and untenured faculty, and various animosities that 
may be present. 
64 Gray, supra note 16, at 11. 
65 See Brooks, supra note 41, at 734 (cautioning that, if faculty members are not assured confidentiality in the peer 
review process, many faculty members will refuse to vote, fearing that their opinions could be disliked by deans or 
department chairpersons); E-mail from John Paul Christoff, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, Ohio Northern 
University-Claude W. Petit College of Law, to Adrienne Belyea, Washington College of Law (Oct. 11, 2005, 
10:47:58 EST) (on file with author) (“[The secret ballot is] productive.  Each faculty member should be free to vote 
his/her conscience without fear of offending the dean (whose preferences may or may not be known).”); E-mail 
from Kevin Johnson, Associate Dean of Academic Affairs, University of California, Davis School of Law), to 
Adrienne Belyea, Washington College of Law (Sept. 15, 2005, 15:46:09 EST) (on file with author) (“[The secret 
ballot is] productive—it allows for a vote without fear of repercussion.”); E-mail from William Mock, Associate 
Dean for Academic Affairs, The John Marshall Law School, to Adrienne Belyea, Washington College of Law (Sept. 
16, 2005, 14:45:59 EST) (on file with author) (“[The secret ballot] has been productive, and widely recognized as 
such, in that it allows votes of conscience, not pressure from administration or colleagues.”); E-mail from law 
professor who requested anonymity, Penn State University, Dickinson School of Law, to Adrienne Belyea, 
Washington College of Law (Sept. 16, 2005, 16:31:47 EST) (on file with author) (relating that “some faculty may 
prefer a secret ballot because they believe that the Dean can seek retribution for their voting”). 
66See Seigel, supra note 14, at 416 (“In theory, faculty members and administrators exercise shared authority over 
the formulation of policy, procedures, and operating decisions.”). 
67 Levmore, supra note 9, at 2222. 
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undermines the purpose of tenure, which is to protect faculty members from retaliation by the 
administration for espousing unpopular ideas.68 If a dean can retaliate against a tenured 
professor for voting in a way that is adverse to his or her wishes—for example, by withholding a 
salary increase, program funding, or appointment to a particular committee—one must question 
how the open voting system preserves the essential goal of academic freedom.69 
The pressure to vote in accordance with the beliefs of the dean or senior faculty members 
to avoid reprisal or castigation is even more pervasive among untenured faculty.70 Because 
 
68 E-mail from Alan Chen, Professor of Law, University of Denver Sturm College of Law, to Ira P. Robbins, 
Washington College of Law (Mar. 24, 2006, 11:40:47 EST) (on file with author) (“Under [our] rules, if a single 
faculty member calls for a closed ballot, one must be held.  The rationale for this rule, which other schools have as 
well, is that if even a single person feels chilled by a non-anonymous vote, it should be done by secret ballot.”); E-
mail from law professor who requested anonymity, to Ira P. Robbins, Washington College of Law (Dec. 8, 2005, 
20:05:21 EST) (on file with author) (“We have a full discussion of candidates, or other issues, before we vote.  
Motions, such as to promote someone, are clearly made publicly.  I like the idea of secret ballots, however, because 
it takes away any reality or perception of the possibility of retaliation for one’s vote.  I should note that I don’t 
believe we have any instances of retaliation for one’s vote, but sometimes discussions are highly charged.  
Especially non-tenured members of the faculty (who vote on employment decisions at [our law school]) feel 
protected and freer to vote as they choose with a secret ballot.”)  In a slightly different context, in situations in which 
faculty members are voting for a new dean from a pool that contains one or more internal candidates, many law 
schools that typically use an open ballot for other hiring decisions mandate the use of the secret ballot.  See E-mail 
from Glenda Pierce, Associate Dean, University of Nebraska College of Law, to Adrienne Belyea, Washington 
College of Law (Sept. 16, 12:23:57 EST) (on file with author) (“The only time a secret ballot has been used is for 
voting on the candidates for dean when there is an internal candidate.”).  The justification for this change in 
procedure is that the individual who is ultimately chosen to be the new dean could retaliate against those that did not 
vote affirmatively for his or her selection. 
69 See Brooks, supra note 41, at 709 (citing Ralph Fuchs, Academic Freedom—Its Basic Philosophy, Function, and 
History, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 431 (1963)); cf. National Labor Relations Board, Protection of Your Rights, 
http://www.nlrb.gov/nlrb/shared_files/brochures/election.asp (last visited Apr. 21, 2006) (stating that, due to the 
high potential that union employers can place undue influence on their employees in union elections, union elections 
require a secret ballot vote). 
70 Since untenured faculty account for 65% of all faculty appointments in institutions of higher learning, this 
presents a serious problem.  American Association of University Professors, supra note 36; see E-mail from M. 
Thomas Arnold, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, University of Tulsa College of Law, to Adrienne Belyea, 
Washington College of Law (Sept. 23, 2005, 15:25:29 EST) (on file with author) (“[One of the] advantages to the 
secret ballot [is that] junior [especially untenured] faculty do not feel at risk in voting.  I know for a fact that 
untenured faculty sometimes feel very vulnerable when it comes to controversial matters.”); E-mail from Bruce 
Berner, Associate Dean for Academics, Valparaiso University School of Law, to Adrienne Belyea, Washington 
College of Law (Oct. 11, 2005, 11:19:19 EST) (on file with author) (“The value of [the secret ballot] process I 
believe is a protection of younger colleagues.”); E-mail from John Paul Christoff, Associate Dean for Academic 
Affairs, Ohio Northern University-Claude W. Petit College of Law, to Adrienne Belyea, Washington College of 
Law (Oct. 11, 2005, 10:47:58 EST) (on file with author) (“Each faculty member should be free to vote his/her 
conscience without fear of offending . . . tenured faculty (in the case of untenured faculty, whose tenure is decided 
by tenured faculty vote).”); E-mail from Darryll Jones, Associate Dean of Academic Affairs, University of 
Pittsburgh School of Law, to Adrienne Belyea, Washington College of Law (Oct. 11, 2005, 16:00:09 EST) (on file 
with author) (“The [secret ballot] policy was implemented out of concern for untenured faculty who may take what 
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untenured faculty serve in a probationary status at the discretion of the tenured faculty, they are 
“necessarily beholden” to them for continued appointment.71 As a result, untenured faculty—
more so than their tenured colleagues—necessarily feel greater trepidation in expressing their 
opinions.72 Since society expects professors to be “deeply engaged with colleagues and 
administrators on a myriad of controversial educational issues,”73 untenured faculty may face 
devastating repercussions if they vote in opposition to their senior colleagues’ positions under an 
open voting system.  The ultimate consequence is that a faculty committee or the dean may deny 
tenure to a faculty member who voted contrary to the wishes of others on a faculty personnel (or 
other) matter.74 At one undergraduate institution, for example, an untenured history professor 
refused to vote in accordance with his department chair who believed that the university should 
reserve a seat within the department for a woman.75 Instead, the professor advanced the 
politically unpopular notion that the seat should go to the most qualified candidate, regardless of 
 
some would view as [a] controversial or unpopular stance on an issue that would not otherwise be subject to secret 
ballot.”); E-mail from Philip Lacy, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, University of South Carolina School of 
Law, to Adrienne Belyea, Washington School of Law (Oct. 12, 2005, 19:26:01 EST) (on file with author) (“The 
thought is that a secret ballot on hiring decisions protects junior faculty members who might fear [publicly] 
disagreeing with senior members of the faculty.”); E-mail from Phillip McIntosh, Associate Dean for Academic 
Affairs, Mississippi College School of Law, to Adrienne Belyea, Washington College of Law (Oct. 10, 2005, 
15:17:51 EST) (on file with author) (“Faculty members prefer [a] secret ballot so as to avoid any undue pressure, 
particularly on untenured faculty who are voting on hiring issues.”); E-mail from Lawrence Moore, Associate Dean 
for Academic Affairs, Loyola University New Orleans School of Law, to Adrienne Belyea, Washington College of 
Law (Oct. 11, 2005, 12:46:59 EST) (on file with author) (“[The secret ballot] does protect untenured members of the 
faculty.”); E-mail from Brian Shannon, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, Texas Tech University School of 
Law, to Adrienne Belyea, Washington College of Law (Sept. 16, 2005, 14:37:04 EST) (on file with author) (“I 
believe that untenured faculty may feel less pressured in voting their minds on hiring decisions with the secret 
ballot.”); E-mail from Marshall Tracht, Vice Dean, Hofstra University School of Law, to Adrienne Belyea, 
Washington College of Law (Oct. 11, 2005, 12:23:37 EST) (on file with author) (“[The secret] ballot . . . mitigates 
any nervousness that untenured faculty may have about someone holding their vote against them.”); E-mail from 
law school official who requested anonymity, to Adrienne Belyea, Washington College of Law (Oct. 10, 2005, 
20:26:45 EST) (on file with author) (“The rationale [for using the secret ballot] for entry level hiring is to protect 
untenured folks from any possibility of intimidation in the tenure process.”). 
71 See Benjamin Ernst, David A. Hollinger & Jonathan Knight, Professors of Practice, 91 ACADEME 60 (Jan. 1, 
2005), 2005 WLNR 176897.  This document presents the official report of the American Association of University 
Professors’ Committee A on Academic Freedom and Tenure.  Id. 
72 See id.  
73 See id.  
74 Seigel, supra note 14, at 424-26.   
75 Id. at 425. 
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gender.76 As a result of expressing his opinion on what he thought was in the school’s best 
interest, the university later denied the professor a tenured position.77 Rather than risk such a 
fate, many untenured faculty members typically will vote according to how those with power 
vote, rather than according to the dictates of their own consciences.78 
Many professors also refrain from voting in a way that is adverse to the views of other 
professors or the dean for fear that their colleagues or students may misunderstand their votes or 
use their votes against them in some way.79 In one documented situation, students at a university 
desired to become members of the university’s decision-making body.80 When students 
 
76 Id.  
77 See id. at 424 (noting that there was no other reason why this professor should have been denied tenure, given his 
strong record as a professor).  For instance, by the age of 34, he had graduated from Harvard University and 
authored 26 works.  Id. According to various reports, he “has a first rate teaching record and consistently receives 
rave reviews from students.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  His department chair even wrote that, “in 
every category of measurement—in teaching effectiveness, scholarship, and in service to the department, the 
college, and the university—[he] has performed in an exemplary manner.”  Id.  (internal quotation marks omitted).  
78 See Wentz, supra note 7, at 585.  
79 See E-mail from Eric Andersen, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, University of Iowa College of Law, to 
Adrienne Belyea, Washington College of Law (Sept. 16, 2005, 11:59:54 EST) (on file with author) (“I believe 
[secret ballot voting for appointments matters and other issues when requested by a member of the faculty] is 
generally regarded as a positive rule, allowing faculty members to vote their consciences without fear of giving 
offense or injuring relationships.”); E-mail from law school official who requested anonymity, to Adrienne Belyea, 
Washington College of Law (Nov. 3, 2005, 12:12:14 EST) (on file with author) (“The secret ballot is more 
productive because faculty feel free to vote their choice without disclosure to their colleagues.”); E-mail from Carol 
Goforth, Associate Dean, University of Arkansas School of Law-Fayetteville, to Adrienne Belyea, Washington 
College of Law (Sept. 16, 2005, 12:16:53 EST) (on file with author) (“Certainly some negative comments made in 
the course of discussions have been reported back to candidates, who then must deal with hurt feelings and 
resentment.  And certainly, critical observations in some of our meetings have sometimes strained some relations on 
the faculty.  But not to any great extent, and I think that the faculty credits part of that with our respect for the secret 
ballot process.”); E-mail from law professor who requested anonymity, Penn State University, Dickinson School of 
Law, to Adrienne Belyea, Washington College of Law (Sept. 16, 2005, 16:31:47 EST) (on file with author) (relating 
that some faculty may think that “knowledge of who voted against a candidate who ultimately joins the faculty may 
at some point leak out and affect the relationship of those two colleagues”); E-mail from law school official who 
requested anonymity, to Adrienne Belyea, Washington College of Law (Oct. 10, 2005, 20:26:45 EST) (on file with 
author) (“[The secret ballot] prevents people from being able to bully or exert pressure on their colleagues.”); E-mail 
law school official who requested anonymity, to Adrienne Belyea, Washington College of Law (Oct. 12, 2005, 
18:35:52 EST) (on file with author) (“[The secret ballot allows] faculty to vote in accordance with true feelings 
without pressure that their vote will disappoint colleagues, candidates, etc.”).  But see E-mail from Darryll Jones, 
Associate Dean of Academic Affairs, University of Pittsburgh School of Law, to Adrienne Belyea, Washington 
College of Law (Oct. 11, 2005, 16:00:09 EST) (on file with author) (“Some faculty members objected to the 
inference that untenured faculty would somehow be ‘punished’ for an unpopular or controversial stance and thought 
secret ballots ‘uncollegial.’ ”). 
80 See, e.g., Robert T. Blackburn & John D. Lindquist, Faculty Behavior in the Legislative Process: Professorial 
Attitudes vs. Behavior Concerning Inclusion of Students in Academic Decision-Making, 44 SOC. OF EDUC. 398, 398 
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proposed this idea at a joint student-faculty assembly, the majority of faculty—in an open ballot 
conducted in front of the students—voted preliminary approval of the proposal.81 Two weeks 
later, however, when the faculty voted on the issue formally through secret ballot, the faculty 
dismissed the idea.82 The possible reasons for this discrepancy exemplify the way in which the 
open voting system chills honest voting.  The presence of the students influenced the faculty 
because they felt pressure to accommodate the students’ desires.83 This example illustrates that 
many faculty members fear becoming unpopular if they vote in a way that is contrary to those 
around them.  Clearly a majority of the faculty did not agree with the students’ proposition, but 
because they did not want to upset the students, the majority either raised their hands or refrained 
from voting altogether.84 This situation is analogous to what happens when a school employs an 
open voting system for personnel decisions.  If a professor hears the dean or a senior colleague 
whom he or she does not want to alienate espouse a certain stance on an issue, that professor 
may put his or her beliefs aside and vote along with that person.  If the vote is secret, however, 
faculty are free to vote without this fear of alienation or vindictiveness.  
The “show of hands syndrome” is another disadvantage of the open voting system,85 in 
which fence-sitters—faculty who are indecisive on an issue—tend to vote with the majority.86 
Associate Dean Shirley Mays of Capital University Law School has witnessed this phenomenon:  
“[P]eople seem to be more willing to vote ‘no’ on a secret ballot than with a show of hands.”87 
(1971) (discussing the distinguishable voting behavior patterns in an open voting system versus a secret ballot 
system).   
81 Id. at 399-400.   
82 Id. at 400.   
83 Id.  
84 Id.  I suspect that there have been similar experiences at many law schools, although I have not specifically 
inquired. 
85 Id. at 410. 
86 Id.  
87 E-mail from Shirley Mays, Associate Dean of Academic Affairs, Capital University Law School, to Adrienne 
Belyea, Washington College of Law (Oct. 10, 2005, 10:01:57 EST) (on file with author); see E-mail from law 
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As the example in the previous paragraph demonstrates, when the faculty actually voted for the 
student-generated proposal by secret ballot, the fence-sitters chose to vote a different way.  The 
open voting system thus produced an outcome that was not indicative of each faculty member’s 
true beliefs regarding the best interests of the institution. 
Consider another case in point.  Dickinson School of Law, prior to and for a while after 
its merger with Pennsylvania State University (PSU) in 2000, had a tradition of using secret 
ballots on faculty personnel matters.88 With the arrival of a new Dean in 2002, however, the 
situation changed.  One faculty member wrote that, to his credit, the Dean “is leading an 
aggressive charge to hire ‘impact’ laterals and to embrace the PSU research model . . . .”89 
Another faculty member wrote, “He has been pushing for aggressive recruitment of laterals—
which is great.”90 But this move for aggressive change did not come without controversy.  It 
came, for example, “at a time when we have some significant curricular gaps and when tensions 
 
school official who requested anonymity, to Adrienne Belyea, Washington College of Law (Oct. 11, 2005, 09:25:16 
EST) (on file with author) (“The current [open ballot] system may change the default ‘neutral’ to ‘yes’ and make it 
more difficult to cast a ‘no’ vote, since most cases currently result in an overall ‘yes’ vote.”). 
88 I contacted Penn State-Dickinson professor Francis J. Mootz III in his then-capacity as Associate Dean.  Dean 
Mootz described the Penn State system as contentious and in flux and suggested that he did not wish to be quoted as 
providing the “official” description of his school’s practices because there might be competing views.  Subsequently 
I followed up with inquiries to individual professors and decided that it made sense to report all Penn State-
Dickinson responses anonymously, although not all professors insisted on it.  For overview statements on the use of 
secret ballots at the school, see, e.g., E-mail from law professor who requested anonymity, Penn State University, 
Dickinson School of Law, to Ira P. Robbins, Washington College of Law (Dec. 2, 2005, 10:48:48 EST) (on file with 
author) (“At Penn State Dickinson, for [many] years we have used written ballots on faculty votes taken for 
personnel decisions, including hiring, promotion and tenure.  We also sometimes have used written ballots for 
matters that were deemed sensitive.  We keep written minutes of the meetings and the vote is recorded.”).  On 
occasion, the Penn State-Dickinson law faculty has also voted secretly on other issues.  For example, “[d]uring the 
last three years particularly, we have used written ballots when anonymity was requested on clearly sensitive 
matters, such as votes about the faculty’s views on whether we prefer a continuing relationship with Penn State or a 
realignment with Dickinson College.”  E-mail from law professor who requested anonymity, Penn State University, 
Dickinson School of Law, to Ira P. Robbins, Washington College of Law (Dec. 4, 2005, 14:47:57 EST) (on file with 
author). 
89 E-mail from law professor who requested anonymity, Penn State University, Dickinson School of Law, to Ira P. 
Robbins, Washington College of Law (Oct. 27, 2005, 16:32:33 EST) (on file with author). 
90 E-mail from law professor who requested anonymity, Penn State University, Dickinson School of Law, to Ira P. 
Robbins, Washington College of Law (Dec. 2, 2005, 10:48:48 EST) (on file with author). 
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between and among faculty and Dean are high.”91 In addition, “some of the recruits, as 
wonderful as they are, have been his former colleagues from his previous institution—and in 
some instances, recruits have been good friends of the dean.”92 As a result of these and other 
disagreements, “during the second season of voting [after his arrival, the dean] began advocating 
against secrecy in balloting.”93 Another faculty member wrote, “[t]he Dean has been very vocal 
about moving to a completely non-secret ballot approach.”94 Indeed, as yet another member of 
the faculty wrote, “we had been told repeatedly by the Dean that we are the single unit at PSU 
that has the horrible practice of voting on hiring, promotion and tenure by secret ballot.”95 A
faculty member summarized the situation as follows:   
 
91 E-mail from law professor who requested anonymity, Penn State University, Dickinson School of Law, to Ira P. 
Robbins, Washington College of Law (Oct. 27, 2005, 16:32:33 EST) (on file with author). 
92 E-mail from law professor who requested anonymity, Penn State University, Dickinson School of Law, to Ira P. 
Robbins, Washington College of Law (Dec. 2, 2005, 10:48:48 EST) (on file with author). 
93 Id. Another faculty member reported that the issue was raised almost immediately, but that it has been sharpened 
in succeeding years.  E-mail from law professor who requested anonymity, Penn State University, Dickinson School 
of Law, to Ira P. Robbins, Washington College of Law (Mar. 25, 2006, 10:00:06 EST) (on file with author). 
94 E-mail from law professor who requested anonymity, Penn State University, Dickinson School of Law, to Ira P. 
Robbins, Washington College of Law (Dec. 4, 2005, 22:26:43 EST) (on file with author).  “The fear is that open 
ballots will chill individual expression, but the administration keeps assuring the faculty that no retaliation for votes 
against an administration sponsored candidate.”  Id.
95 E-mail from law professor who requested anonymity, Penn State University, Dickinson School of Law, to Ira P. 
Robbins, Washington College of Law (Dec. 16, 2005, 11:44:29 EST) (on file with author).  Another faculty member 
related that, on another occasion, the Dean had told the faculty that the law school was the only unit in the country 
that used secret ballots on hiring decisions.  E-mail from law professor who requested anonymity, Penn State 
University, Dickinson School of Law, to Ira P. Robbins, Washington College of Law (Dec. 2, 2005, 14:23:07 EST) 
(on file with author).  Neither assertion, however, is accurate.  In fact, in December 2005, “the President of the PSU 
Faculty Senate conducted a workshop here . . . on faculty governance and he was surprised to hear that [the 
representation about PSU] had been made (the Dean was not present at the meeting).”  E-mail from law professor 
who requested anonymity, Penn State University, Dickinson School of Law, to Ira P. Robbins, Washington College 
of Law (Dec. 16, 2005, 11:44:29 EST) (on file with author); see also E-mail from law professor who requested 
anonymity, Penn State University, Dickinson School of Law, to Ira P. Robbins, Washington College of Law (Dec. 
19, 2005, 15:41:04 EST) (on file with author) (“[W]e were told last week by the President of the Faculty Senate that 
. . . most units use secret ballots.”).  One faculty member distilled the situation: 
We have had to deal with two different contexts:  hiring and promotion/tenure.  When 
PSU departments vote on hiring it is not uncommon for the vote to be by secret ballot.  When the 
P&T Review Committee votes, however, it is true that the law school may be the only unit that 
utilizes a secret ballot.  However, this is explained by the fact that our P&T Committee is a 
Committee of the Whole of tenured faculty members, whereas all other Colleges have a 5-7 person 
Committee that does the initial review.  After vigorous discussion among 5-7 people (from 
different departments . . .), it would be strange to then vote by paper.  There is more of a 
consensus approach, or at least an open delineation of the points of disagreement, and the vote is 
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The two rationales offered for maintaining the Dickinson Law School (pre-2000 
merger) tradition of secret ballots . . . were to avoid having untenured or even 
tenured faculty members believe that there could be repercussions based on their 
voting, and to avoid having news of a negative vote ever leak out to one’s future 
colleague and make the relationship difficult.  The rationale offered by the Dean 
for public voting is to prevent illegitimate bases for decision-making, including 
potentially discriminatory voting.96 
The faculty complied with the Dean’s request and put an end to the tradition of secret 
balloting.  “For part of one hiring season, at the new dean’s insistence, we adopted open voting 
on new hires.”97 This decision did not sit well with some faculty members, however.  One 
consequence was that “[s]ome people either abstained [from voting on hiring matters] or 
declined to attend hiring meetings because of reluctance to vote openly.”98 “[M]any of the 
faculty believ[ed] that voting for the Dean’s agenda (including hiring decisions) [was] the way to 
avoid trouble for oneself.”99 
Reconsidering its decision, in the 2004-05 academic year the faculty reversed itself 
again.100 One faculty member wrote, “I see good reasons for anonymity in voting—and 
dangerous reasons.  The last two years have for the first time made me desire anonymous voting 
 
probably not even by a show of hands.  However, when the entire tenured faculty enters the room 
with all its baggage to vote on promotion or tenure, it is a different case. 
E-mail from law professor who requested anonymity, Penn State University, Dickinson School of Law, to Ira P. 
Robbins, Washington College of Law (Mar. 25, 2006, 10:00:06 EST) (on file with author). 
96 E-mail from law professor who requested anonymity, Penn State University, Dickinson School of Law, to Ira P. 
Robbins, Washington College of Law, (Oct. 27, 2005, 16:32:33 EST) (on file with author). 
97 E-mail from law professor who requested anonymity, Penn State University, Dickinson School of Law, to Ira P. 
Robbins, Washington College of Law (Dec. 2, 2005, 10:48:48 EST) (on file with author). 
98 Id. “My personal opinion is that sometimes negative views are being expressed passively by an[] individual’s 
choice not to attend or send a proxy for  the meeting in question.  We haven’t expressly dealt with this—but we may 
have to eventually.”  E-mail from law professor who requested anonymity, Penn State University, Dickinson School 
of Law, to Ira P. Robbins, Washington College of Law (Dec. 4, 2005, 14:47:57 EST) (on file with author).  The 
Faculty Bylaws provide:  “Two-thirds of the faculty constitute a quorum except that persons on sabbatical or 
authorized leave shall not be counted when determining the pertinent size of the faculty unless such persons are 
present at the meeting.”  Bylaws of the Faculty of the Dickinson School of Law, § III (as amended Apr. 19, 2004). 
99 E-mail from law professor who requested anonymity, Penn State University, Dickinson School of Law, to Ira P. 
Robbins, Washington College of Law (Oct. 27, 2005, 16:32:33 EST) (on file with author). 
100 See E-mail from law professor who requested anonymity, Penn State University, Dickinson School of law, to 
Adrienne Belyea, Washington College of Law (Sept. 16, 2005, 16:31:47 EST) (on file with author). 
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because I personally feel the pressure, even though I’m not easily intimidated.”101 But the 
faculty did not move back to strict secret balloting, for the Dean had stated that “he [would] 
ignore anonymous negative notes in his calculation, citing the need to protect diversity among 
faculty ranks, etc.”102 Instead, the faculty adopted a compromise—a secret ballot that is “not 
anonymous in the full sense, but also without having to reveal one’s vote to the Dean or 
colleagues.”103 Under this modified secret ballot approach,  
[o]ur current practice is for each voter to sign the written ballots, and the written 
ballots are to be kept secure by the Office of Human Resources. . . .  [T]he dean 
has agreed to respect this decision.  The ballots are read and counted by the chair 
of the faculty, who is a member of the faculty elected by the faculty.  Sometimes 
the secretary or another individual has helped, with no objection from the 
faculty.104 
In fairness to many of the individuals at Penn State-Dickinson who shared information 
and comments with me, some referred to their situation as “atypical,”105 “somewhat unique,”106 
and “a bit in transition,107 as the school has gone through a recent merger, is expanding its 
faculty, and during the past four years has been debating its location and institutional 
affiliation.108 For whatever reasons, however, the school is in flux, at best, or in conflict, at 
 
101 E-mail from law professor who requested anonymity, Penn State University, Dickinson School of Law, to Ira P. 
Robbins, Washington College of Law (Dec. 2, 2005, 11:45:27 EST) (on file with author). 
102 E-mail from law professor who requested anonymity, Penn State University, Dickinson School of Law, to Ira P. 
Robbins, Washington College of Law (Oct. 27, 2005, 16:32:33 EST) (on file with author). 
103 Id.
104 E-mail from law professor who requested anonymity, Penn State University, Dickinson School of Law, to Ira P. 
Robbins, Washington College of Law (Dec. 4, 2005, 14:47:57 EST) (on file with author).  “I think our written, 
signed ballot approach is our current compromise that would permit a candidate who feels unfairly treated the option 
of discovery in litigation—but at the same time permits some insulation for voters against a perception that we have 
a very strong dean who leans on people to get his way.”  Id.
105 E-mail from law professor who requested anonymity, Penn State University, Dickinson School of Law, to Ira P. 
Robbins, Washington College of Law (Oct. 28, 2005, 11:05:49 EST) (on file with author). 
106 E-mail from law professor who requested anonymity, Penn State University, Dickinson School of Law, to Ira P. 
Robbins, Washington College of Law (Dec. 4, 2005, 14:47:57 EST) (on file with author) (due to “relatively recent 
joinder with Penn State, very recent battles over location, etc.”). 
107 E-mail from law professor who requested anonymity, Penn State University, Dickinson School of Law, to Ira P. 
Robbins, Washington College of Law (Dec. 4, 2005, 20:35:42 EST) (on file with author). 
108 The school is now proceeding with a two campus approach with buildings in both Carlisle and State College as 
part of Penn State.  E-mail from law professor who requested anonymity, Penn State University, Dickinson School 
of Law, to Ira P. Robbins, Washington College of Law (Mar. 25, 2006, 10:00:06 EST) (on file with author). 
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worst, on secret-ballot voting. Even the faculty who urged caution on extrapolating too broadly 
from the Penn State example saw the common denominator clearly.  One wrote:  “[I realize that] 
tensions between administration and faculty probably are always a potential factor for any 
educational employer deciding who[m] to hire and promote.”109 And another wrote:  “By saying 
that our situation is atypical I meant that the issues go well beyond the specific hiring decision.  
But . . . I realize that this is the typical situation to the extent that what is at issue is power.”110 
2.  Repercussions of the Chilling Effect 
As the Penn State example illustrates, the repercussions of the chilling effect on 
institutions of higher learning are enormous.  Because an academic institution depends on the 
considered votes of the faculty, and because a candidate’s colleagues are the ones who are 
empowered to evaluate his or her performance, it is essential that faculty members maintain the 
confidentiality of their votes.111 When faculty members fear that the administration will use their 
votes against them, they may vote for candidates whom they deem to be unqualified or only 
marginally qualified.112 Since a university serves as a primary marketplace of ideas, professors 
often work together and share information to further the goals of the educational institution and 
beyond.  If a school hires, retains, promotes, or tenures an unqualified or marginally qualified 
professor, the free exchange of ideas will diminish and the quality of the academic institution as 
 
109 E-mail from law professor who requested anonymity, Penn State University, Dickinson School of Law, to Ira P. 
Robbins, Washington College of Law (Dec. 4, 2005, 14:47:57 EST) (on file with author). 
110 E-mail from law professor who requested anonymity, Penn State University, Dickinson School of Law, to Ira P. 
Robbins, Washington College of Law (Oct. 28, 2005, 11:05:49 EST) (on file with author).  In fairness to the Dean of 
Pennsylvania State University, Dickinson School of Law, as well as to the integrity of this Article (and therefore to 
me), the reader should be aware that several times I invited him comment on matters pertaining to the use of secret 
vs. open ballots at his school.  I have never had a reply. 
111 Brooks, supra note 41, at 733. 
112 North, supra note 51, at 217-18; see also Brooks, supra note 41, at 706 (reiterating that the release of confidential 
peer review decisions “would chill [the] tenure debate and promote blandness in the review process,” which would 
almost automatically grant tenure to unqualified candidates); George R. Kramer, Title VII on Campus: Judicial 
Review of University Employment Decisions, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1206, 1235 n.148 (1982) (arguing that a secret 
ballot is essential in the university setting because of the academic institution’s need for an “uninhibited assessment” 
of faculty candidates). 
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a whole will decrease.113 If a university grants tenure for the wrong reasons or promotes an 
unqualified or marginally qualified professor, for example, this may lead to a decline in the 
quality of instruction and scholarship at the institution.114 
3.  Secret Ballot Critiques and Responses 
Opponents of  the secret ballot system argue that the potential for discriminatory voting 
outweighs the chilling effect that the system engenders.  Critics postulate that secret voting 
prevents accountability by permitting faculty members to conceal votes that may be influenced 
by negative or inappropriate purposes.115 Knowing that a secret ballot system protects 
 
113 See Valerie L. Brown, The Confidential Peer Review Process at Institutions of Higher Education: A Case for the 
Use of a Balancing Test, 41 EDUC. LAW REP. 421, 430 (1988) (stating that, “[w]hen candor diminishes, evaluation 
becomes less thorough and the value and integrity of the peer evaluation system is eroded”). 
114 Id. Several law professors and law school officials across the country provided examples of this phenomenon 
but, to avoid embarrassment to particular colleagues, declined permission to quote or share the story, even 
anonymously. 
115 See North, supra note 51, at 218; see also E-mail from John Strait Applegate, Executive Associate Dean for 
Academic Affairs, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington, to Adrienne Belyea, Washington College of 
Law (Oct. 10, 2005, 08:28:16 EST) (on file with author) (“The danger of secret ballots is that they permit voters not 
to express their true reasons openly, which enables (a) ambushing a candidate, or (b) voting against him/her for 
personal rather than professional reasons, or (c) both.”); E-mail from Ann Carlson, Academic Associate Dean, 
University of California at Los Angeles School of Law, to Adrienne Belyea, Washington College of Law (Sept. 16, 
2005, 09:07:13 EST) (on file with author) (“The downside [of the secret ballot] is that sometimes (though 
infrequently), particularly in a tenure case, a candidate receives negative votes even though no one has articulated 
reasons for the negative votes.”); E-mail from Mayer Freed, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Curriculum, 
Northwestern University School of Law, to Adrienne Belyea, Washington College of Law (Sept. 16, 2005, 15:32:10 
EST) (on file with author) (“I feel that our decision to require open voting prevents faculty from pursuing positions, 
such as political or disciplinary preferences, that they are unwilling to state or defend openly.”); E-mail from Darryll 
Jones, Associate Dean of Academic Affairs, University of Pittsburgh School of Law, to Adrienne Belyea, 
Washington College of Law (Oct. 11, 2005, 16:00:09 EST) (on file with author) (“Accusations concerning the 
motives of people based on their [secret] vote are always bandied about but those accusations can never be directed 
at any particular faculty member.”); E-mail from Paul Kurtz, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, University of 
Georgia School of Law, to Adrienne Belyea, Washington College of Law (Oct. 10, 2005, 11:13:46 EST) (on file 
with author) (“There have been times when the secret ballot nature of our voting system has served as a shield for 
the exercise of unreasoned and unexpressed judgments against the candidacy of various candidates.”); E-mail from 
Shirley Mays, Associate Dean of Academic Affairs, Capital University Law School, to Adrienne Belyea, 
Washington College of Law (Oct. 10, 2005, 10:01:57 EST) (on file with author) (“[F]aculty promotion/tenure 
decisions are more productive with an open ballot because it prevents non-legitimate reasons for voting one way or 
another.”); E-mail from William Mock, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, John Marshall Law School, to 
Adrienne Belyea, Washington College of Law (Sept. 16, 2005, 14:45:59 EST) (on file with author) (“The possible 
negative impact [of the secret ballot] relates to the risk of decisions unrelated to enunciated standards, including the 
possibility that some votes may be cast for unlawful discriminatory reasons.”); E-mail from Tamara Piety, Associate  
Professor of Law, University of Tulsa College of Law, to Ira P. Robbins, Washington College of Law (Mar. 6, 2006, 
13:20:17 EST) (on file with author) (“In my opinion, the secret ballot where one doesn't have to give a reason for the 
vote is pernicious and allows for discriminatory treatment that is hard to ferret out and gives free rein to those who 
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confidentiality, faculty members who hold biased and subjective motivations may abuse the 
system, since they do not have to disclose their true intentions for voting in a certain way.116 In 
particular, critics and the courts are concerned with faculty voting that is a result of biases 
involving race, color, gender, sexual orientation, religion, national origin, or age.  In In re 
Dinnan,117 for example—a case involving a denial of promotion to the rank of associate 
professor and termination of employment at the University of Georgia—the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in 1981, compelled a member of the Education Promotion 
Review Committee to disclose his vote, writing that an open voting system would deter only 
those individuals who are acting pursuant to bad motives and those who are weak-willed.118 
would make tenure decisions popularity contests rather than decisions on the merits.”); E-mail from law school 
official who requested anonymity, to Adrienne Belyea, Washington College of Law (Sept. 16, 2005, 10:26:26 EST) 
(on file with author) (“[The secret ballot] does allow a few faculty the chance to ‘get even’ and to vote their own 
personal (petty?) dislikes, without regard to the institutional interest.”); E-mail from law school official who 
requested anonymity, to Adrienne Belyea, Washington College of Law (Oct. 10, 2005, 20:26:45 EST) (on file with 
author) (“[The secret ballot] creates a danger that the grounds of the decision are not things that people are 
comfortable saying and therefore that may not be very sound bases for voting.”); E-mail from law school official 
who requested anonymity, to Adrienne Belyea, Washington College of Law (Oct. 11, 2005, 11:41:18 EST) (on file 
with author) (“[M]y gut tells me that secret ballots mask some result-manipulative behaviors (e.g., ranking who one 
perceives to be the front-runner the lowest possible so as to assist a less-favorite personal candidate).”). 
116 North, supra note 51, at 218 n.46. 
117 661 F.2d 426 (5th Cir. 1981).   
118 Id. at 432 (dismissing the necessity of a secret ballot system, for only the cowardly lack the “courage to stand up 
and publicly account for [their] decision[s]”); see E-mail from Scott Altman, Associate Dean for Academic 
Administration, University of Southern California Law School, to Adrienne Belyea, Washington College of Law 
(Sept. 16, 2005, 10:06:18 EST) (on file with author) (“Our norm . . . is that anyone who is opposed to a promotion or 
a hire should say so and give reasons.”); E-mail from Margaret Currin, Associate Dean, Campbell University, 
Norman Adrian Wiggins School of Law, to Adrienne Belyea, Washington College of Law (Oct. 14, 2005, 12:48:35 
EST) (on file with author) (“We don’t have a policy disallowing secret ballots or speaking to them at all.  To date, 
individual faculty members have been quite open with respect to their positions on hiring decisions.”); E-mail from 
Paul Kurtz, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, University of Georgia School of Law, to Adrienne Belyea, 
Washington College of Law (Oct. 10, 2005, 11:13:46 EST) (on file with author) (“There have been times when the 
secret ballot nature of our voting system has served as a shield for the exercise of unreasoned and unexpressed 
judgments against the candidacy of various candidates.”); E-mail from Lawrence Moore, Associate Dean for 
Academic Affairs, Loyola University New Orleans School of Law, to Adrienne Belyea, Washington College of Law 
(Oct. 11, 2005, 12:46:59 EST) (on file with author) (“[T]enured faculty members hide behind a secret ballot.”); E-
mail from Todd D. Rakoff, Vice Dean for Academic Programming, Harvard Law School, to Adrienne Belyea, 
Washington College of Law (Sept. 19, 2005, 15:15:12 EST) (on file with author) (“I would say the faculty is mixed 
on [the secret ballot’s] value—some think that it allows people to vote the way they really think by removing social 
pressures, others think that it promotes irresponsibility.”); E-mail from Ronald Rychlak, Associate Dean for 
Academic Affairs, University of Mississippi School of Law, to Adrienne Belyea, Washington College of Law (Sept. 
16, 2005, 12:22:10 EST) (on file with author) (“[The secret ballot] gives people cover to vote without expressing 
their opinions.”); E-mail from Katharine Silbaugh, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, Boston University School 
30
Even the strong-willed, however, face adverse consequences if their votes run contrary to the 
positions of those in power.119 Consequently, the most “courageous” faculty members may 
simply decline to vote altogether or refrain from attending faculty meetings120—neither of which 
situations is desirable.  Although critics claim that the potential for improper motives and 
cowardly voting are problems unique to secret voting systems, they fail to acknowledge that, 
even with an open voting system, faculty members could cloak their improper motives (e.g., 
discrimination, political correctness) behind pretextual reasons for voting against—or for—a 
particular candidate.121 
More recent judicial decisions have alleviated the fear that the use of secret ballots 
facilitates discriminatory motives in faculty hiring and tenure decisions.  In University of 
 
of Law, to Adrienne Belyea, Washington College of Law (Sept. 16, 2005, 09:18:22 EST) (on file with author) 
(“[W]e feel that people deliberate in better faith knowing that they ought to be able to express their reasons for 
votes.”); E-mail from law school official who requested anonymity, to Adrienne Belyea, Washington College of 
Law (Oct. 10, 2005, 20:26:45 EST) (on file with author) (“The negative [of the secret ballot process] is that people 
can vote without explaining themselves in any way.  Thus a candidate can get a substantial number of no votes, or 
even be defeated, without people having to say something.”); E-mail from law professor who requested anonymity, 
to Ira P. Robbins, Washington College of Law (Mar. 24, 2006, 15:12:29 EST) (on file with author) (“I believe the 
secret ballot method is unfair and allows people to hide.  I’m in favor of the deliberative process where everyone 
knows and understands why people have certain opinions about candidates for tenure, promotion or hiring.  I believe 
the legal academe is fraught with unfair processes that other industries would be amazed!!”). 
119 In fact, the AAUP has noted with alarm the increasing trend of using a factor based on “collegiality” in making 
tenure decisions.  American Association of University Professors, On Collegiality as a Criterion for Faculty 
Evaluation, http://www.aaup.org/statements/Redbook/collegia.htm (last visited Apr. 21, 2006).  The AAUP warns 
that using collegiality as a criterion poses a threat to academic freedom: 
In the heat of important decisions regarding promotion or tenure, as well as other matters 
involving such traditional areas of faculty responsibility as curriculum or academic hiring, 
collegiality may be confused with the expectation that a faculty member display “enthusiasm” or 
“dedication,” evince “a constructive attitude” that will “foster harmony,” or display an excessive 
deference to administrative or faculty decisions where these may require reasoned discussion. 
Such expectations are flatly contrary to elementary principles of academic freedom, which protect 
a faculty member’s right to dissent from the judgments of colleagues and administrators.  A 
distinct criterion of collegiality also holds the potential of chilling faculty debate and discussion.  
Id.
120 Brooks, supra note 41, at 734 (“After the Third Circuit’s decision in EEOC v. Franklin and Marshall College,
705 F.2d 110 (3d Cir. 1985) [denying the existence of an academic freedom privilege], an official at the college 
stated that, although no one had yet declined to review faculty candidates for fear of disclosure, the possibility ‘may 
not be far off’ ” (quoting Bitterly, College Prepares to Turn Over Confidential Tenure Files to U.S. Panel, CHRON.
HIGHER EDUC., Aug. 13, 1986, at 20)).  See supra note 98 and accompanying text (discussing situation at Penn 
State-Dickinson). 
121 The situation is not unlike pretextual reasons that one sees, for example, in adverse employment decisions, in 
searches and seizures by police at traffic stops, or in peremptory jury challenges. 
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Pennsylvania v. EEOC,122 the United States Supreme Court formally discarded the idea of a 
judicially sanctioned academic freedom privilege in employment discrimination cases123 and 
ordered the automatic disclosure of votes in all these cases.124 While the Court did not dispute 
that confidentiality plays an integral role in proper functioning peer review processes,125 it ruled 
that, if a party suspects discriminatory motives, the faculty must disclose their votes during 
discovery.126 “[I]f there is a ‘smoking gun’ to be found that demonstrates discrimination in 
tenure decisions, it is likely to be tucked away in peer review files.”127 
This decision acts not only as a tool for victims in discrimination suits, but also as a 
deterrent for potentially dishonest and biased voters.  It is unlikely that faculty members, no 
matter how biased or malicious, would risk having their disingenuous or discriminatory votes 
disclosed—to the faculty and administration, as well as to the public via the judicial process.128 
Secrecy is quickly stripped away in litigation, thereby ultimately ensuring accountability for any 
 
122 493 U.S. 182 (1990). 
123 See North, supra note 51, at 229-31 (stating that the Supreme Court’s decision in University of Pennsylvania v. 
EEOC resolved a circuit split on the extent of the academic freedom privilege in discovery requests for peer review 
materials by a faculty member alleging employment discrimination).  The circuit courts had adopted three different 
approaches in Title VII employment discrimination cases to determine the extent of the academic freedom privilege 
when universities used a secret voting system: (1) The Second Circuit weighed academic freedom interests with 
anti-employment discrimination interests in Gray v. Board of Higher Education, 692 F.2d 901 (2d Cir. 1982); (2) 
the Seventh Circuit recognized a qualified academic freedom privilege in EEOC v. University of Notre Dame du 
Lac, 715 F.2d 331(7th Cir. 1983); and (3) the Third and Fifth Circuits denied any academic freedom privilege in 
EEOC v. Franklin and Marshall College, 705 F.2d 110 (3d Cir. 1985), and In re Dinnan, 661 F.2d 426 (5th Cir. 
1981), respectively.  Id. The Seventh Circuit ruled most favorably toward the academic freedom privilege and 
expressly recognized it as fostering “candid, critical, objective and thorough” evaluations in the peer review process.  
Univ. of Notre Dame du Lac, 715 F.2d at 336. 
124 See University of Pennsylvania, 493 U.S. at 193-94 (rejecting the University’s argument that the academic 
freedom privilege allows it to divert Title VII claims).   
125 Cf. id. at 193 (deciding that the Court did not need to rule on whether confidentiality is instrumental to the proper 
functioning of the peer review process, as the university had argued). 
126 Id.  
127 Id.
128 While one could argue that, upon disclosure, a faculty member who had voted with malicious or discriminatory 
intent could merely articulate some legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for voting against a particular candidate, 
the same argument could be made under the open voting system.  In the latter system, however, the faculty 
member’s position would have to be aired; in the former, it would not.   
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non-academic bases for decisions.  While it is easy to offer a pretextual decision, the litigation 
process works to pierce the pretext.   
So the employment-bias criticism may well be a red herring.  The sexism, racism, or 
other discriminatory bias exhibited in faculty voting is typically not of a crude variety, but rather 
reflects a more subtle reading of résumés, publications, and promotion/tenure files through 
clouded lenses; open or closed voting usually won’t matter much, therefore, because the voting 
faculty member sees the world in a particular way and (contrary to the perceptions of his or her 
colleagues) is not just skulking in the shadows waiting to cast a mean-spirited vote.  The key is 
to have robust debate on the facts so that these clouded judgments can be cleared, to the extent 
possible. 
 Thus, the secret ballot is not a carte blanche for those who act with inappropriate 
purposes.  Nevertheless, to reduce the possibility of voting based on improper motives, some 
schools have implemented modified secret ballot systems.  For hiring decisions, for example, 
several law schools require signed secret ballots, which faculty members may view upon 
request.129 At least one school requires that a faculty member must make this request to the 
entire faculty; most faculty members refrain from asking to see the votes for fear that their peers 
will shame them.130 This system, therefore, compels only those faculty members who truly 
believe that discriminatory voting has occurred to request to view the individual ballots.131 
Under this system, however, faculty members still fear retribution from the dean, who could 
 
129 See E-mail from law school official who requested anonymity, to Adrienne Belyea, Washington College of Law 
(Sept. 15, 2005, 19:33:10 EST) (on file with author) (“For hiring, we sign written ballots so someone who wants to 
know how particular members of the faculty voted has to ask to see the ballots.  This shaming mechanism usually 
works to keep the ballot secret, but on occasion, a faculty member has asked to see the signed ballots.”).  This 
school, however, exercises a strict secret ballot for faculty tenure and promotion decisions.  Id. Schools that treat 
hiring decisions differently from promotion and tenure decisions may give extra weight to the long-term contractual 




presumably view the votes without a request, thus rendering the “shaming mechanism” void.  
There is a variant of this system at the University of Kansas School of Law, whose hiring policy 
requires written responses to the dean.  “[I]n effect, it’s secret from the rest of the faculty but not 
from the dean.”132 
Other schools, including the University of Oregon School of Law, also require a signed 
secret ballot.  Votes at Oregon are disclosed only if a legal proceeding arises; the ballots are not 
accessible to faculty members who wish merely to view them.133 Similarly, at Pennsylvania 
State University, Dickinson School of Law, the ballots for promotion and tenure are secret and 
unsigned, but (unlike the voting procedure for faculty hiring) any member who votes against a 
candidate must include the rationale for that decision in the dossier.134 As long as a neutral party 
keeps the votes confidential from faculty members and the dean, these methods remedy critics’ 
fears that secret ballots mask discriminatory motives, while still preserving the benefits of the 
 
132 E-mail from Edwin W. Hecker, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, University of Kansas School of Law, to 
Adrienne Belyea, Washington College of Law (Oct. 10, 2005, 16:32:01 EST) (on file with author). 
133 See E-mail from Margaret Paris, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, University of Oregon School of Law, to 
Adrienne Belyea, Washington College of Law (Sept. 16, 2005, 16:23:09 EST) (on file with author) (“Ballots are 
secret but are signed and forwarded to the university provost.”). 
134 See E-mail from law professor who requested anonymity, Penn State University, Dickinson School of Law, to 
Adrienne Belyea, Washington College of Law (Sept. 16, 2005, 16:31:47 EST) (on file with author) (“All votes for 
tenure and promotion are by secret paper ballot.  Under [our] rules, a faculty member voting no must provide a 
rationale, so that it can be included in the dossier.  This can be done by passing this information on to the Chair of 
the Committee, rather than in the meeting itself.”).  “The Dean [at Penn State-Dickinson] has announced that he now 
finds this solution unsatisfactory, and we are heading into some votes on lateral candidates shortly.”  E-mail from 
law professor who requested anonymity, Penn State University, Dickinson School of Law, to Ira P. Robbins, 
Washington College of Law (Oct. 27, 2005, 16:32:33 EST) (on file with author); see also E-mail from Kathleen 
Boozang, Associate Dean, Seton Hall University School of Law, to Adrienne Belyea, Washington College of Law 
(Oct. 13, 2005, 17:29:09 EST) (on file with author) (“[W]e save the actual ballots until the Provost/Board approval 
process is complete in case a question or challenge ever arose.”).  But see E-mail from Shirley Mays, Associate 
Dean of Academic Affairs, Capital University Law School, to Adrienne Belyea, Washington College of Law (Oct. 
10, 2005, 10:01:57 EST) (on file with author) (“Our promotion/tenure ballots are signed, and must have reasons for 
the vote.”); E-mail from John Strait Applegate, Executive Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, Indiana University 
School of Law-Bloomington, to Adrienne Belyea, Washington College of Law (Oct. 10, 2005, 08:28:16 EST) (on 
file with author) (“It is our custom at Indiana-Bloomington that persons who intend to vote ‘no’ should explain their 
views in advance of the vote, and that custom is nearly always honored.  Clearly, the purpose of this custom is to 
avoid secret ‘bullet ballots,’ and it has nearly always worked.”).  Since Capital University requires the faculty to 
provide rationale for “no” votes and sign the ballot and Indiana University-Bloomington compels the faculty to 
openly explain “no” votes, these processes are much less confidential than those at Seton Hall and other schools.  
Even though the impetus for all of the policies is to avoid potential legal liability, the benefits of the secret ballot 
may no longer be preserved at schools with these types of procedures. 
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secret ballot.  These systems respect confidentiality, while providing adequate discovery in 
employment discrimination litigation, should the occasion arise.   
Yet another method to avoid the risk of discriminatory votes, used by Valparaiso 
University School of Law, is to alter the format of the ballot while still maintaining strict 
confidentiality.135 Instead of a simple yes/no vote, “the ballot forces evaluation on the three 
criteria of teaching, scholarship and service and disallows a [yes] vote unless there is a positive 
vote in each category.”136 This approach ensures anonymity, counters the temptation of 
improper motives, and, ideally, leads to the appointment or retention of the most qualified 
candidates.  
A third variation of an absolute secret ballot allows administrators and professors to 
identify individual ballots according to different categories, such as tenured or untenured and full 
or assistant professor.  This variation, used at the University of Wyoming College of Law, is 
inadequate to achieve true, open, and effective voting on faculty personnel decisions, however, 
since these categories can often destroy confidentiality, especially in small schools.137 
UCLA School of Law employs yet another variation, allowing its faculty the option to 
waive its secret ballot requirement on an annual basis.138 Even if the faculty waives the secret 
 
135 E-mail from Bruce Berner, Associate Dean for Academics, Valparaiso University School of Law, to Adrienne 
Belyea, Washington College of Law (Oct. 11, 2005, 11:19:19 EST) (on file with author) (“The tenure and promotion 
document requires a secret ballot and even specifies its format.”). 
136 Id. 
137 See E-mail from Dee Pridgen, Associate Dean, University of Wyoming College of Law, to Adrienne Belyea, 
Washington College of Law (Sept. 20, 2005, 16:20:13 EST) (on file with author) (“Yes, [we use secret ballots]—
although votes are identified as coming from full, associate or assistant [professors], and tenured or untenured.  We 
have a really small faculty so these designations can identify some persons.”); E-mail from Ann Carlson, Academic 
Associate Dean, University of California at Los Angeles School of Law, to Adrienne Belyea, Washington College of 
Law (Sept. 16, 2005, 11:11:28 EST) (on file with author) (quoting The UCLA CALL’s Appendix 4 on “Voting 
Rights—Senate Bylaw 55”: “Even though confidentiality would be reduced, it is permissible to report separately the 
votes of different categories of voting members of the department (tenure, non-tenure, etc.) where such information 
is considered useful (e.g., to the Council on Academic Personnel or the Administration).”).  Due to its vagueness, 
the term “useful” may provide a danger to confidentiality. 
138 See E-mail from Ann Carlson, Academic Associate Dean, University of California at Los Angeles School of 
Law, to Adrienne Belyea, Washington College of Law (Sept. 16, 2005, 11:11:28 EST) (on file with author) (“From 
35
ballot in its yearly vote, however, “a secret ballot shall be taken on a specific vote at the request 
of one or more voting members.”139 This option may be beneficial for a university that has had a 
long history of open voting but would like to transition to a secret ballot, or for a school that is 
still apprehensive about potential improper motives.  This system gives the faculty an 
opportunity to see the benefits of a confidential vote without feeling tied down for the long term. 
Notwithstanding these mechanisms that eliminate potential abuses while preserving the 
advantages of a secret ballot system, some critics contend that secret ballots hinder 
communication among faculty members because they do not have an opportunity to discuss 
openly their opinions on hiring, retaining, promoting, or tenuring candidates.140 An open voting 
system, however, creates similar implications.  Faculty members appointed to peer review 
 
the Law School Bylaws:  Voting on academic personnel matters is by secret ballot unless the Faculty votes to waive 
the secret ballot by the following procedure:  The Faculty may decide on an annual basis to waive the secret ballot 
with respect to a given class of personnel actions, provided that this be decided unanimously in a secret ballot of 
Faculty entitled to vote on that class of personnel action, and provided further that a secret ballot shall be taken on a 
specific vote at the request of one or more voting member[s].”).  Basically, UCLA School of Law follows an 
absolute secret ballot procedure, unless the faculty unanimously votes to follow Robert’s Rules of Order. See infra 
notes 188-89 and accompanying text (discussing Robert’s Rules). Under no circumstances is open voting forced on 
faculty members who prefer the secret ballot.   
139 E-mail from Ann Carlson, Academic Associate Dean, University of California at Los Angeles School of Law, to 
Adrienne Belyea, Washington College of Law (Sept. 16, 2005, 11:11:28 EST) (on file with author). 
140 See E-mail from M. Thomas Arnold, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, University of Tulsa College of Law, 
to Adrienne Belyea, Washington College of Law (Sept. 23, 2005, 15:25:29 EST) (on file with author) (“I believe 
that if a person is going to vote for or against someone based on something, it should be something in the record and 
something the faculty has had an opportunity to incorporate into their deliberations.”); E-mail from Mark Kelman, 
Vice Dean, Stanford University Law School, to Adrienne Belyea, Washington College of Law (Sept. 16, 2005, 
10:27:16 EST) (on file with author) (“Open balloting leads to the effort to reach something closer to a consensus.”); 
E-mail from Michelle Simon, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, Pace University School of Law, to Adrienne 
Belyea, Washington College of Law (Sept. 16, 2005, 13:18:26 EST) (on file with author) (“[The secret ballot] 
allows [faculty] to be silent . . . .”); E-mail from Katharine Silbaugh, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, Boston 
University School of Law, to Adrienne Belyea, Washington College of Law (Sept. 16, 2005, 09:18:22 EST) (on file 
with author) (“Although an open vote may have costs in highly political cases, especially for untenured faculty, on 
balance open balloting is superior because it encourages deliberations and defensible positions.”); E-mail from 
Michael Solimine, Associate Dean for Faculty Development, University of Cincinnati College of Law, to Adrienne 
Belyea, Washington College of Law (Sept. 19, 2005, 14:46:41 EST) (on file with author) (“[S]ome faculty have felt 
that the secret ballot practice has been counterproductive . . . by what they see as the arguable dampening of 
discussion during meetings that culminated in a secret ballot.”); E-mail from Charles Tabb, Associate Dean, 
University of Illinois College of Law, to Adrienne Belyea, Washington College of Law (Oct. 10, 2005, 05:48:37 
EST) (on file with author) (“[P]eople believe it is crucial for all views to be aired in public.”); E-mail from law 
school official who requested anonymity, to Adrienne Belyea, Washington College of Law (Nov. 3, 2005, 10:40:19 
EST) (on file with author) (“[O]n balance open balloting is superior because it encourages deliberations and 
defensible opinions.”). 
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committees, for example, often compromise their beliefs out of fear that their opinions will 
create confrontational situations among the faculty or that their colleagues will retaliate against 
them if their opinions do not coincide.141 Consequently, many peer reviews will lead to 
promotion or tenure where faculty members wish to vote against a candidate, but refrain from 
doing so when others are voting affirmatively.142 Thus, ironically, an open voting system may 
actually decrease the value of the communication.143 If there is an open ballot that is leading to 
“groupthink”—i.e., uncritical acceptance of or conformity to prevailing points of view—there 
will also be less deliberation.  Everyone will be looking to the signal from the Powers That Be 
concerning how to act.  If the secret ballot doesn’t promote greater conversation (and, as 
described above, I think it does), then at a minimum there would be an opportunity for each 
individual to vote on the merits after the groupthink discussion has concluded. 
Also, granting tenure to too many unqualified or marginally qualified candidates, instead 
of awarding this status only to those who most merit it, threatens to decrease the “teaching 
 
141 Brooks, supra note 41, at 734. 
142 Id.; see E-mail from Mark Kelman, Vice Dean, Stanford University Law School, to Adrienne Belyea, 
Washington College of Law (Sept. 16, 2005, 10:27:16 EST) (on file with author) (“I suspect over the course of the 
28 years that I have been here at Stanford that there may have been tenure votes that could have turned out negative 
. . . in secret ballots that were affirmative in open balloting because of fear of having one’s negative vote disclosed 
to the candidate, though I certainly can’t identify any particular cases in which I believe that to be true.”); E-mail 
from Mae Kuykendall, Senior Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, Michigan State University College of Law, to 
Adrienne Belyea, Washington College of Law (Oct. 10, 2005, 22:36:57 EST) (on file with author) (“There have 
been occasional stealth votes against tenure and against a candidate.  If the votes were public, the phenomenon could 
not occur.”); E-mail from Jethro Lieberman, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, New York Law School, to 
Adrienne Belyea, Washington College of Law (Sept. 16, 2005, 14:32:33 EST) (on file with author) (“Secret ballots 
on tenure allow faculty members to dissent in private from the tendency to support the decision of a committee, 
which is the body recommending to the tenured faculty the application of a candidate for tenure.  I believe that it is 
productive, not counterproductive [to use a secret ballot].  We occasionally deny tenure, though in my memory we 
have never overturned a committee recommendation.  What the secret ballot produces, though, is a larger (usually 
negative) vote than probably would otherwise occur.”); E-mail from Shirley Mays, Associate Dean of Academic 
Affairs, Capital University Law School, to Adrienne Belyea, Washington College of Law (Oct. 10, 2005, 10:01:57 
EST) (on file with author) (“[P]eople seem to be more willing to vote no on a secret ballot than with a show of 
hands.”); E-mail from law school official who requested anonymity, to Adrienne Belyea, Washington College of 
Law (Oct. 11, 2005, 09:25:16 EST) (on file with author) (“The current [open ballot] system may change the default 
vote from ‘neutral’ to ‘yes’ and make it more difficult to cast a ‘no’ vote, since most cases currently result in an 
overall yes vote.”); E-mail from law school official who requested anonymity, to Adrienne Belyea, Washington 
College of Law (Sept. 16, 2005, 10:26:26 EST) (on file with author) (“[The secret ballot] does lead to more negative 
votes.”). 
143 Brooks, supra note 41, at 734.  
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quality and scholarly excellence among permanent faculty members.”144 A report published by 
the Commission on Academic Tenure in Higher Education further supports these arguments.  
The Commission concluded that the embattled concept of tenure was not due only to the concept 
itself, but also was partially a result of “serious deficiencies in its application and 
administration”145 that allow less-than-qualified individuals to be granted tenure.146 If 
universities are to maintain academic excellence using peer evaluation, professors must make 
faculty hiring and retention decisions “deliberately and carefully . . . free from the undue external 
pressure” that open voting inevitably creates.147 
Moreover, a secret ballot does not hinder communication because many schools still hold 
open discussions before the matter goes to a secret vote.  Those faculty members who hold 
conflicting views have the opportunity (but are not required) to voice their opinions, exchange 
ideas, and even lobby other faculty to adopt their viewpoint.  The controlling difference is that, 
with a secret ballot, in the end each individual can cast his or her ballot considering the 
discussion, yet free from the influence of colleagues or administrators who choose to voice their 
opinions openly.148 
144 Id.  
145 COMMISSION ON ACADEMIC TENURE IN HIGHER EDUCATION, FACULTY TENURE 20 (1973). 
146 Brooks, supra note 41, at 735. 
147 See American Association of University Professors, Statement on Procedural Standards in the Renewal or 
Nonrenewal of Faculty Appointments, POLICY DOCUMENTS & REPORTS 14, 16-17 (1984). 
148 See E-mail from Dennis Arrow, Professor of Law, Oklahoma City University School of Law, to Adrienne 
Belyea, Washington College of Law (Oct. 13, 2005, 09:01:18 EST) (on file with author) (“Within our Promotion 
and Tenure Board . . . all retention, promotion, and tenure decisions are . . . voted on by secret ballot.  We respect 
that tradition so much that we adhere to it even where the discussion makes it apparent that everyone will likely (or 
certainly) be voting ‘yes.’ ”); E-mail from Jeffrey Berman, Associate Dean, University of Missouri-Kansas City 
School of Law, to Adrienne Belyea, Washington College of Law (Sept. 16, 2005, 11:37:01 EST) (on file with 
author) (“[Our secret ballot policy has had a] neutral effect, since the debate prior to the vote often reveals the voting 
proclivity anyway.”); E-mail from Ann Carlson, Academic Associate Dean, University of California at Los Angeles 
School of Law, to Adrienne Belyea, Washington College of Law (Sept. 16, 2005, 09:07:13 EST) (on file with 
author) (“This is taken from The UCLA CALL’s Appendix 4 re ‘Voting Rights—Senate Bylaw 55’:  ‘Nothing in 
these requirements prevents faculty members from making their own vote public.’ ”); E-mail from H. Miles Foy, 
Executive Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, Wake Forest University School of Law, to Adrienne Belyea, 
Washington College of Law (Oct. 11, 2005, 09:27:59 EST) (on file with author) (“[W]e . . . have a practice of 
soliciting individual oral comments from each member of the faculty concerning the faculty candidate or hiring 
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B.  The Secret Ballot Decreases Disharmony Among the Faculty 
Employing the secret ballot is also important because it may help to alleviate disharmony 
among the faculty.149 This goal is significant because academic excellence relies on collegial 
relationships and the free exchange of ideas among faculty members.150 Faculty who fear 
reprisal or who generally do not associate with one another are not likely to provide feedback on 
their colleagues’ projects, to discuss teaching methodologies, or observe each other’s 
 
decision in question, and thus each faculty member has an opportunity (but not an obligation) to declare his 
preferences specifically and openly.  The individual oral comments are then followed by the secret ballot.  My 
impression is that the system works very well indeed."); E-mail from Edwin W. Hecker, Associate Dean for 
Academic Affairs, University of Kansas School of Law, to Adrienne Belyea, Washington College of Law (Oct. 10, 
2005, 16:32:01 EST) (on file with author) (“We have a full and frank discussion [regarding] promotion/tenure, but 
then each person is free to vote his/her conscience without fear of gossip getting back to the candidate.”); E-mail 
from Phillip McIntosh, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, Mississippi College School of Law, to Adrienne 
Belyea, Washington College of Law (Oct. 10, 2005, 15:17:51 EST) (on file with author) (“The secret ballot is] 
[p]roductive and essentially noncontroversial.  We fully discuss the candidate prior to voting.  Faculty members 
prefer secret ballot so as to avoid any undue pressure.”); E-mail from Marshall Tracht, Vice Dean, Hofstra 
University School of Law, to Adrienne Belyea, Washington College of Law (Oct. 11, 2005, 12:23:37 EST) (on file 
with author) (“On hiring, we tend to operate on consensus, and if [a] secret ballot is close there will often be a 
motion [to] reconsider and further discussion so that some more general consensus can be reached.”).  But see E-
mail from Shirley Mays, Associate Dean of Academic Affairs, Capital University Law School, to Adrienne Belyea, 
Washington College of Law (Oct. 10, 2005, 10:01:57 EST) (on file with author) (“It has made for some counter-
productive hiring decisions where the conversation about the candidate seems fine, then the candidate receives many 
no votes without explanation.”). 
149 See E-mail from Kathleen Boozang, Associate Dean, Seton Hall University School of Law, to Adrienne Belyea, 
Washington College of Law (Oct. 13, 2005, 17:29:09 EST) (on file with author) (“[The secret ballot] is absolutely 
more productive.  It eliminates actual knowledge about who voted how, unless people speak before the vote, and 
diminishes hard feelings and gossip.”); E-mail from Edwin W. Hecker, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, 
University of Kansas School of Law, to Adrienne Belyea, Washington College of Law (Oct. 10, 2005, 16:32:01 
EST) (on file with author) (“[E]ach person is free to vote his/her conscience without fear of gossip getting back to 
the candidate.”); E-mail from Barbara Kritchevsky, Associate Dean, The University of Memphis-Cecil C. 
Humphreys School of Law, to Adrienne Belyea, Washington College of Law (Oct. 10, 2005, 12:17:52 EST) (on file 
with author) (“[The secret ballot is] helpful—people are freer to vote their minds without worrying about what will 
get back to the person involved.”); E-mail from law school official who requested anonymity, to Adrienne Belyea, 
Washington College of Law (Oct. 11, 2005, 09:25:16 EST) (on file with author) (“Information about the faculty 
members who cast negative votes generally gets back to the person whose tenure or promotion is at issue, and this 
has resulted in some awkwardness and hard feelings.”). 
150 The collegiality that a secret ballot system helps to preserve contributes to maintenance of academic excellence in 
many ways.  Professors who provide valuable feedback on their colleagues’ projects help produce better scholarship, 
which inevitably brings recognition to that school.  Seigel, supra note 14, at 411-12 (citing the AALS’ statement of 
good practices by law professors in the discharge of their ethical and professional responsibilities).  Similarly, when 
professors collaborate and discuss different teaching methods, they may improve a law school’s or university’s 
reputation for the quality of its faculty.  Further, academic excellence also depends on the faculty’s participation in 
committees and their willingness to mentor junior faculty.  Id.  A disharmonious faculty, however, is not inclined to 
be collegial and thus participate in improving the quality of the law school or university in these or other ways.   
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classes.  Indeed, they might not talk to each other at all.  With a secret ballot on personnel and 
other sensitive issues, however, the best interests of the school can be nourished and advanced. 
Under the secret ballot system, faculty members can fulfill their professional duty and 
vote honestly on what they believe is in the school’s best interest without creating 
confrontational situations.151 Further, by not knowing how others vote, a professor cannot get 
upset at other faculty members if they vote in a way that he or she deems inappropriate or 
unacceptable.152 It is less likely, therefore, that a faculty member would refuse to work with 
other faculty members, decline to participate on a particular committee, or cast a future vote that 
is motivated only by spite simply because faculty members do not share the same beliefs—about 
law, about legal education, or even about life in general.  In essence, over time the secret ballot 
system may actually lessen faculty factionalization, not increase it.  This system, then, is the best 
means to preserve the collegial relationships153 upon which, in part, an academic institution 
thrives.154 As Associate Dean Carol Goforth of the University of Arkansas School of Law-
Fayetteville reported, the secret ballot avoids  
 
151 See David McMillin, Note, University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC and Dixon v. Rutgers: Two Supreme Courts 
Speak on the Academic Freedom Privilege, 42 RUTGERS L. REV. 1089, 1103 (1990) (citing the concerns expressed 
by amici curiae of small colleges in EEOC v. Franklin & Marshall College, 775 F.2d 110 (3d Cir. 1985)); see, e.g., 
E-mail from William Rich, Associate Dean, Washburn University School of Law, to Adrienne Belyea, Washington 
College of Law (Sept. 19, 2005, 12:53:43 EST) (on file with author) (“An illustration of helpful use of secret ballots 
occurred recently when we were making decisions about hiring.  It was a contentious issue, the faculty was divided, 
and some new faculty may have been uncomfortable siding with one group or another.  Knowing that we would use 
a secret ballot helped to alleviate those fears.”).  
152 See E-mail from D. Benjamin Beard, Associate Dean, University of Idaho College of Law, to Adrienne Belyea, 
Washington College of Law (Sept. 16, 2005, 09:11:31 EST) (on file with author) (“[The secret ballot] is more 
productive because it allows for a more confident selection process with less outside influence from peers.  We have 
a small faculty. Voting outside of the ‘mainstream’ is generally more difficult in smaller groups—the secret ballot 
ameliorates some of that concern.”).  Of course, faculty may express their views openly during the faculty 
discussion, but that would be by choice. 
153 See E-mail from M. Thomas Arnold, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, University of Tulsa College of Law, 
to Adrienne Belyea, Washington College of Law (Sept. 23, 2005, 15:25:29 EST) (on file with author) (“The . . . 
secret ballot . . . probably minimizes hard feelings after votes on very controversial cases.”); E-mail from Lawrence 
Cunningham, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, Boston College Law School, to Adrienne Belyea, Washington 
College of Law (Oct. 9, 2005, 21:15:42 EST) (on file with author) (“[The secret ballot] helps collegiality.”).  
154 See E-mail from W. Clark Williams, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, University of Richmond School of 
Law, to Adrienne Belyea, Washington College of Law (Sept. 16, 2005, 15:38:56 EST) (on file with author) (“[The 
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fear that negative votes will be reported back to the candidate, and might poison 
or harm future relationships . . . .  Certainly some negative comments made in the 
course of discussions have been reported back to candidates, who then must deal 
with hurt feelings and resentment.  And certainly, critical observations in some of 
our meetings have sometimes strained some relations on the faculty.  But not to 
any great extent, and I think that the faculty credits part of that with our respect 
for the secret ballot process.155 
The open voting system, on the other hand, threatens to create and perpetuate disharmony 
among the faculty.  When making personnel decisions, professors aim to provide truthful 
assessments of a candidate’s potential or actual scholarly achievement and teaching 
effectiveness.156 Forcing professors to reveal their votes and thus disclose how they view 
candidates’ qualifications openly, however, may strain indispensable collegial relationships, 
since inevitably faculty members will hold opposing views and, for example, those faculty 
members who have been granted tenure will naturally often hold grudges against those who 
voted against them.157 As a result, compulsory open voting on controversial matters often pits 
 
secret ballot] enhances the collegial working relationship among faculty, particularly as to one who may be 
hired/promoted/tenured with a less than unanimous vote, and with whom ongoing positive relations are, of course, 
important.”). 
155 E-mail from Carol Goforth, Associate Dean, University of Arkansas School of Law-Fayetteville, to Adrienne 
Belyea, Washington College of Law (Sept. 16, 2005, 12:16:53 EST) (on file with author). 
156 Brooks, supra note 41, at 736 (citing the Report of the Committee on Confidentiality in Matters of Faculty 
Reappointment, 13 U. CHI. REC. 165, 165-66, 168 (1979)).  In fact, academic excellence relies on a peer evaluation 
system in which personnel decisions are made pursuant to the faculty’s honestly held beliefs.  See, e.g., supra text 
accompanying notes 144-46 (stating that granting tenure to unqualified professors threatens to decrease the quality 
of teaching and scholarship in universities).          
157 See Brooks, supra note 41, at 736 (“[S]ome academicians argue that pressure brought by members of the 
administration on certain faculty members who favor or disfavor a particular tenure candidate might lead to 
adversarial relationships between the faculty and administration.”).  For example, Associate Dean Michael Ariens of 
St. Mary’s University School of Law finds the secret ballot to be productive in faculty hiring decisions because 
such decisions are fraught with interpersonal conflicts.  The tenured faculty took a secret vote on 
whether to tenure the wife of a tenured colleague. A secret ballot made the consequences of voting 
one’s conscience less severe than an open ballot, for despite the outrage of some faculty members 
who were friends of the applicant, they could not directly accuse anyone of voting negatively in 
her case. 
E-mail from Michael S. Ariens, Associate Dean for Academic and Student Affairs, St. Mary’s University 
School of Law, to Adrienne Belyea, Washington College of Law (Sept. 16, 2005, 09:07:13 EST) (on file 
with author) (Dean Ariens was not a member of the law school administration at the time of that vote).  
Similarly, new faculty hires might hold grudges against senior colleagues who voted against their 
appointment. 
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faculty members against each other158 and creates factions among them.159 When factions exist 
and tempers flare, professors may simply refuse to work with one another or may even seek 
retribution for casting an unpopular vote.160 And once factions have developed, open voting only 
exacerbates the disharmony and alienation among the factions that it helped to create.  While a 
professor may often agree with, and thus vote with, the rest of his or her faction, that is certainly 
not always the case.  And when the professor’s assessment is not in accordance with the rest of 
his or her group, under the open voting system the professor may feel compelled to vote with that 
group even if he or she has a different viewpoint.  To avoid this compulsion and the subsequent 
disharmony among and even within faculty groups, schools should implement the secret ballot or 
its functional equivalent, thus allowing the faculty an unfettered vote and more productive and 
amiable relationships thereafter. 
III.  LAW SCHOOLS’ USE OF SECRET BALLOTS 
A.  A Range of Views 
 
Following the recommendations of the academic community and well-respected 
academic associations, such as the AAUP,161 most law schools in the United States recognize the 
benefits of a secret ballot and implement the system in making various faculty personnel 
decisions.162 Many of these schools use the secret ballot for personnel decisions pursuant to 
 
158 Id.; see E-mail from law professor who requested anonymity, Penn State University, Dickinson School of Law, to 
Adrienne Belyea, Washington College of Law (Sept. 16, 2005, 16:31:47 EST) (on file with author) (relating that 
some faculty may think that “knowledge of who voted against a candidate who ultimately joins the faculty may at 
some point leak out and affect the relationship of those two colleagues”); E-mail from law school official who 
requested anonymity, to Adrienne Belyea, Washington College of Law (Sept. 16, 2005, 10:26:26 EST) (on file with 
author) (“But [the secret ballot] does allow a few faculty to get the chance to ‘get even’ and to vote their own 
personal (petty?) dislikes, without regard to the institutional interest.”). 
159 See Gray v. Board of Higher Educ., 92 F.R.D. 87, 93 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), rev’d, 692 F.2d 901 (2d Cir. 1982). 
160 Gray, supra note 16, at 29.   
161 See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text (describing the AAUP’s steadfast position that the secret ballot 
system is the best practice for institutions of higher learning when making faculty hiring and retention decisions). 
162 See Association of American Law Schools, supra note 14, at 499 (noting that it is common at most law schools to 
use the secret ballot in hiring decisions).  See also, e.g., E-mail from Peter-Raven Hansen, Associate Dean for 
Academic Affairs, George Washington University School of Law, to Sima P. Bhakta, Washington College of Law 
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school policy,163 while others use the practice as a matter of custom.164 For instance, the Rules 
and Procedures for the Faculty Appointments Process for the College of William & Mary, 
 
(Mar. 2, 2005, 13:54:25 EST) (stating that all faculty personnel decisions are decided by secret ballot); Telephone 
Interview by Sima P. Bhakta with Bruce Kobayashi, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, George Mason 
University Law School (Mar. 24, 2005) (providing that all faculty decisions are made through secret ballot); E-mail 
from David Millon, Associate Dean of Academic Affairs, Washington and Lee University School of Law, to Sima 
P. Bhakta, Washington College of Law (Apr. 6, 2005, 22:01:08 EST) (on file with author) (“[W]e use secret ballots 
both for faculty hiring and for tenure decisions.  This is routine, so no faculty member needs to make a request.”); E-
mail from Theresa Newman, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, Duke University School of Law, to Adrienne 
Belyea, Washington College of Law (Sept. 16, 2005, 12:03:29 EST) (on file with author) (stating that Duke uses a 
secret ballot for faculty tenure decisions); E-mail from Todd D. Rakoff, Vice Dean for Academic Programming, 
Harvard Law School, to Adrienne Belyea, Washington College of Law (Sept. 19, 2005, 15:15:12 EST) (on file with 
author) (stating that Harvard Law School uses a secret ballot for both hiring and promotion decisions); Telephone 
Interview by Sima P. Bhakta with Elma Richardson, Executive Assistant to the Dean, Georgetown University Law 
Center (Mar. 24, 2005) (explaining that faculty appointment and tenure decisions are made by secret ballot); E-mail 
from W. Clark Williams, Associate Dean of Academic Affairs, University of Richmond Law School, to Sima P. 
Bhakta, Washington College of Law (Mar. 21, 2005, 17:53:14 EST) (on file with author) (“[W]e do take a ballot 
vote on personnel/hiring decisions.  It is not [prescribed] in [the] Bylaws, but is a longstanding practice at our Law 
School.”). 
163 See, e.g., E-mail from Ann Carlson, Academic Associate Dean, University of California at Los Angeles School 
of Law, to Adrienne Belyea, Washington College of Law (Sept. 16, 2005, 11:11:28 EST) (on file with author) 
(“This is taken from The UCLA CALL’s Appendix 4 re ‘Voting Rights—Senate Bylaw 55’:  ‘The vote on all 
personnel matters shall be by secret ballot.  Procedures should be designed so that only the voter shall know how he 
or she voted.’ ”); E-mail from John Paul Christoff, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, Ohio Northern University-
Claude W. Petit College of Law, to Adrienne Belyea, Washington College of Law (Oct. 11, 2005, 10:47:58 EST) 
(on file with author) (“The Constitution of the College of [L]aw requires a secret ballot on the acceptability of 
faculty candidates.”); E-mail from Carol Goforth, Associate Dean, University of Arkansas School of Law-
Fayetteville, to Adrienne Belyea, Washington College of Law (Sept. 16, 2005, 14:16:53 EST) (on file with author) 
(“The following language appears in our personnel document relating to hiring of faculty members:  ‘The vote shall 
be by secret ballot, no form of proxy voting shall be allowed, and no candidate for the position under consideration, 
or for another directly-affected position, shall attend the meeting.’ ”); E-mail from Joan Howarth, Associate Dean 
for Academic Affairs, University of Nevada Las Vegas, William S. Boyd School of Law, to Adrienne Belyea, 
Washington College of Law (Oct. 10, 2005, 07:27:31 EST) (on file with author) (“The pertinent portion of our by-
laws provides as follows:  ‘Voting will be by voice or by show of hands . . . except in personnel matters . . . .  In 
such cases, the vote will be taken by ballot, with the ballots to be counted at the meeting by the person designated by 
the presiding officer.’ ”); E-mail from Darryll Jones, Associate Dean of Academic Affairs, University of Pittsburgh 
School of Law, to Adrienne Belyea, Washington College of Law (Oct. 11, 2005, 16:00:09 EST) (on file with author) 
(“The vote with respect to promotion by tenure is secret by virtue of a simple directive in the faculty handbook that 
states, ‘Vote will be by secret, written ballot.  Members may vote yes, no, or abstain.’  This phrase is the entire 
policy.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); E-mail from Paul Kurtz, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, 
University of Georgia School of Law, to Adrienne Belyea, Washington College of Law (Oct. 10, 2005, 11:13:46 
EST) (on file with author) (“University rules require that all votes on promotion and tenure and appointment be 
taken by secret ballot.”); E-mail from Philip Lacy, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, University of South 
Carolina School of Law, to Adrienne Belyea, Washington School of Law (Oct. 12, 2005, 19:26:01 EST) (on file 
with author) (“The [Tenure and Promotion] Procedures state, ‘Faculty members shall vote by secret ballot.’ ”); E-
mail from Brian Shannon, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, Texas Tech University School of Law, to Adrienne 
Belyea, Washington College of Law (Sept. 16, 2005, 14:37:04 EST) (on file with author) (“[O]ur rules state:  
Hiring:  ‘All votes taken on appointments and the terms thereof shall be by secret ballot.  The ballots shall be 
counted and the results announced to the faculty at the end of the balloting.’  Promotion:  ‘At the close of the 
discussion, a secret ballot shall be taken in the case of each candidacy . . . .’  Tenure:  ‘At the close of the discussion, 
a secret ballot shall be taken.’ ”) (internal quotation marks omitted); E-mail from law school official who requested 
anonymity, to Adrienne Belyea, Washington College of Law (Oct. 12, 2005, 18:35:52 EST) (on file with author) 
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Marshall-Wythe School of Law state:  “Decisions on appointment matters will be made by 
Faculty. . . .  The Faculty will vote by secret ballot on an appointment.”165 Similarly, the UCLA 
Senate Bylaw for voting rights pertaining to personnel decisions provides, “The vote on all 
personnel matters shall be by secret ballot.  Procedures should be designed so that only the voter 
shall know how he or she voted.”166 Catholic University’s Columbus School of Law is also 
strongly committed to the secret ballot tradition for faculty personnel decisions; indeed, then-
Dean William Fox emphasized that he “would not want this to change—ever!!”167 
(“With respect to hiring [and promotion and tenure] decisions, our rule reads:  ‘Voting . . . shall be by secret written 
ballot.  A faculty member, whose presence and participation have been by other means pursuant [our rule on proxy 
voting], may make arrangements to protect the anonymity of his or her vote to the extent feasible.’ ”). 
164 See, e.g., E-mail from M. Thomas Arnold, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, University of Tulsa College of 
Law, to Adrienne Belyea, Washington College of Law (Sept. 23, 2005, 15:25:29 EST) (on file with author) (“To my 
knowledge, neither our Governance document nor our Promotion and Tenure document expressly require a written, 
secret ballot for hiring.  However, I’ve been here 25 years and this has [been] our unbending practice.  We’ve never 
deviated from it.”); E-mail from James Devine, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, University of Missouri-
Columbia School of Law, to Adrienne Belyea, Washington College of Law (Sept. 18, 2005, 12:10:17 EST) (on file 
with author) (“I have been here 25 years and we have always used secret ballots for [personnel] purposes.”); E-mail 
from H. Miles Foy, Executive Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, Wake Forest University School of Law, to 
Adrienne Belyea, Washington College of Law (Oct. 11, 2005, 09:27:59 EST) (on file with author) (“We [use secret 
ballots] as a matter of custom, and we do it in every case.  A faculty member does not have to request or invoke the 
procedure.”); E-mail from Darryll Jones, Associate Dean of Academic Affairs, University of Pittsburgh School of 
Law, to Adrienne Belyea, Washington College of Law (Oct. 11, 2005, 16:00:09 EST) (on file with author) (“The 
vote with respect to hiring is secret by longstanding practice, there is no written policy.”); E-mail from Cheney 
Joseph, Vice Chancellor for Academic Affairs, Louisiana State University, Paul M. Hebert Law Center, to Adrienne 
Belyea, Washington College of Law (Sept. 16, 2005, 14:20:00 EST) (on file with author) (“We have followed for 
many years a practice of voting on all personnel matters by secret ballot—hiring, tenure, promotion, appointment of 
visitors, appointment of faculty.  The procedure is followed in all cases without a specific request.”); E-mail from 
Warner Lawson, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, Howard University School of Law, to Adrienne Belyea, 
Washington College of Law (Sept. 16, 2005, 16:54:23 EST) (on file with author) (“[The secret ballot policy is] 
automatic, but I think by history—not by rule.”); E-mail from Christine Manolakas, Associate Dean for Academic 
Affairs, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, to Adrienne Belyea, Washington College of Law (Oct. 
11, 2005, 18:28:58 EST) (on file with author) (“Although not technically automatic, a secret ballot is the tradition 
for both faculty hiring and promotion/tenure decisions.  I cannot remember a secret ballot being used for any other 
purpose in almost 30 years.”); E-mail from W. Clark Williams, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, University of 
Richmond School of Law, to Adrienne Belyea, Washington College of Law (Sept. 16, 2005, 15:38:56 EST) (on file 
with author) (“Not a written policy [on secret ballots], no.  But a long-standing practice has been for hiring or 
[promotion and tenure] decisions, always to be by secret ballot.”). 
165 E-mail from Lizbeth Jackson, Associate Dean for Administration, College of William & Mary Law, Marshall-
Wythe School of Law, Washington College of Law (Mar. 21, 2005, 13:19:31 EST) (on file with author). 
166 E-mail from Ann Carlson, Academic Associate Dean, University of California at Los Angeles School of Law, to 
Adrienne Belyea, Washington College of Law (Sept. 16, 2005, 11:11:28 EST) (on file with author) (“This is taken 
from The UCLA CALL’s Appendix 4 re ‘Voting Rights—Senate Bylaw 55’ ”). 
167 E-mail from William Fox, Dean, Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law, to Eileen M. 
Flanagan, Assistant to the Dean, to Sima P. Bhakta, Washington College of Law (Apr. 6, 2005, 14:25:46 EST) 
(“1. We ALWAYS use secret ballot in matters involving faculty personnel.  It is non-discretionary in our system 
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Other law schools employ the secret ballot system only when a member of the faculty 
requests it concerning a particular issue.168 The University of Maryland School of Law generally 
votes through open ballot procedures; however, the university’s long-standing practice permits 
any faculty member to request a vote by secret ballot for any issue.169 As a matter of collegiality,  
Maryland grants the faculty member’s request without any procedural obstacles or separate votes 
on whether there should be a secret ballot vote on the issue.170 Taking this approach further, 
some schools that officially have the same written policy as Maryland have evolved in practice—
and sometimes in writing, amending the previous policy—to an automatic secret ballot system 
for personnel decisions, due to the frequency of requests for a secret ballot for these decisions.171 
under the Handbook.  2.  When the faculty votes on things other than personnel matters, we usually use either a 
‘voice’ vote or a ‘show of hands.’ ”).  
168 See, e.g., E-mail from Ediberto Roman, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, Florida International University, 
College of Law, to Adrienne Belyea, Washington College of Law (Oct. 10, 2005, 12:40:46 EST) (on file with 
author) (“A faculty member must request [a secret ballot], (usually before the meeting).”).  E-mail from Jethro 
Lieberman, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, New York Law School, to Adrienne Belyea, Washington College 
of Law (Sept. 16, 2005, 14:32:33 EST) (on file with author) (“A request for [a] secret ballot on most issues is 
usually honored (normally a consensus will develop); I do not recall a request for [a] secret ballot on hiring new 
faculty.”).  Dean Lieberman also stated that a secret ballot is used for tenure and promotion decisions.  Id. 
169 E-mail from Richard Boldt, Associate Dean for Research and Faculty Development, University of Maryland 
School of Law, to Sima P. Bhakta, Washington College of Law (Apr. 6, 2005, 12:09:40 EST) (on file with author); 
see also E-mail from Bruce Berner, Associate Dean for Academics, Valparaiso University School of Law, to 
Adrienne Belyea, Washington College of Law (Oct. 11, 2005, 11:19:19 EST) (on file with author) (“For hires, [the 
secret ballot] must be requested. . . .  [There is no written policy], just a culture of permitting it whenever 
requested.”); E-mail from Gary Maveal, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, University of Detroit Mercy School 
of Law, to Adrienne Belyea, Washington College of Law (Sept. 16, 2005, 08:40:49 EST) (on file with author) (“I 
believe it is customary to agree to secret ballot by request unless someone calls for a vote on that preliminary 
issue.”); E-mail from W. Clark Williams, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, University of Richmond School of 
Law, to Adrienne Belyea, Washington College of Law (Sept. 16, 2005, 15:38:56 EST) (on file with author) 
(“[V]oting will be by secret ballot on any issue if any faculty member requests it [other than hiring, promotion and 
tenure by which, it is an automatic secret ballot].”). 
170 E-mail from Richard Boldt, Associate Dean for Research and Faculty Development, University of Maryland 
School of Law, to Sima P. Bhakta, Washington College of Law (May 9, 2005, 10:39:02 EST) (on file with author) 
(suggesting that the faculty would comply with the request as a matter of collegiality).   
171 See, e.g., E-mail from Jeffrey Berman, Associate Dean, University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law, to 
Adrienne Belyea, Washington College of Law (Sept. 16, 2005, 11:37:01 EST) (on file with author) (“Although the 
Faculty Bylaws provide that ‘a secret ballot vote shall be taken whenever requested by any Voting Member’ it has 
been the practice to make the secret ballot [an] automatic one when the vote deals with faculty hiring.”); E-mail 
from Seth Chandler, Vice Dean of Academic Affairs, University of Houston Law Center, to Adrienne Belyea, 
Washington College of Law (Sept. 16, 2005, 10:59:34 EST) (on file with author) (“If one faculty member requests 
it, we use a secret ballot (which means that it almost always occurs).”); E-mail from Barbara Kritchevsky, Associate 
Dean, The University of Memphis-Cecil C. Humphreys School of Law, to Adrienne Belyea, Washington College of 
Law (Oct. 10, 2005, 12:17:52 EST) (on file with author) (“Our governing rules provide that any faculty may request 
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Consider the maturation of secret-ballot voting at the University of the Pacific, McGeorge 
School of Law.  The Faculty Bylaws had provided (and still provide) that, on matters of 
retention, promotion, and tenure, secret ballots are automatic, but on matters of hiring, as well as 
on any other question, “[v]oting shall be conducted by secret ballot if requested by any voting 
member and approved by the presiding officer or by one-third of the voting members present at 
the meeting.”172 McGeorge faculty members reported that—because secret ballots were 
typically requested on committee recommendations for new hires, and that “in recent memory 
we have always used secret ballots for hiring decisions”173—the faculty came to view secret 
ballots on faculty personnel matters as “routine.”174 Recognizing this evolution, the faculty 
amended the Bylaws, effective December 1, 2004, to provide for automatic secret ballots on 
motions to recommend offers of employment,175 as well as on motions to prioritize appointments 
candidates.176 
Other schools, including the University of Pittsburgh School of Law, recognize that even 
making a request for a secret ballot can raise suspicions among colleagues and the 
administration.  Therefore, this practice is still vulnerable to the dangers of the open ballot 
discussed previously.  Although the University of Pittsburgh has an automatic secret ballot for 
 
a secret ballot on any vote.  The Promotion and Tenure committee generally prepares ballots, assuming we’ll vote 
that way.”); E-mail from William Mock, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, The John Marshall Law School, to 
Adrienne Belyea, Washington College of Law (Sept. 16, 2005, 14:45:59 EST) (on file with author) (“Technically, it 
has to be requested, but it has been requested in every vote in memory.  In recent years, the Chair of the Selections 
and Appointments Committee will typically save someone the trouble of making the motion by making the motion 
him/herself sua sponte.”). 
172 Faculty Bylaws on Employment, Promotion, and Tenure, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law.  
At Chicago-Kent College of Law, secret ballots are not used for hiring or promotion and tenure, unless 25% of the 
voting faculty then present vote to do so.  See Appendix C. 
173 E-mail from law professor at University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, to Ira P. Robbins, Washington 
College of Law (Dec. 13, 2005, 11:37:15 EST) (on file with author). 
174 E-mail from Gerald Caplan, Professor of Law, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, to Ira P. 
Robbins, Washington College of Law (Dec. 8, 2005, 19:43:11 EST) (on file with author). 
175 Faculty Bylaws on Employment, Promotion, and Tenure, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, § 
II.B.2.d (effective Dec. 1, 2004). 
176 Id. § II.B.3.b.   
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personnel decisions, Associate Dean Darryll Jones discussed a recently implemented method to 
protect confidentiality and ensure thoughtful, productive decisions on all other issues.   
We have recently (about two years ago) adopted a policy whereby any 
faculty member may request a secret vote on any matter before the faculty.  The 
faculty member . . . sends such a request to the Chairperson of the Faculty 
Steering Committee . . . in confidence and the Chairperson must grant the request 
without divulging the name of the requestor.  The faculty member need not 
divulge his or her identity to the Chairperson.177 
This point was raised by others as well.  A faculty member at another law school wrote: 
[W]e recently had an issue on the agenda for our faculty meeting (where secret 
ballots are at the option of a faculty member) that was somewhat charged.  
Several non-tenured members of the faculty asked some of us who are tenured to 
request a secret ballot.  This raises two points:  (1) [t]hey perceived the secret 
ballot as a positive and a way to allow them freedom in voting, and (2) [t]hey 
preferred to not be the ones to ask for the secret ballot, which perhaps is a flaw in 
our system if one is disadvantaged by asking for it.178 
Some schools—including the University of California at Davis School of Law and the 
University of Iowa College of Law—use a double-blind system for the submission of secret 
ballots.  Iowa also has a non-academic administrator transcribe the ballots, to avoid the 
recognition of handwriting.179 For the same reason, the University of Akron tries to have ballots 
with the names listed on them to be checked or circled.180 
Another method that has been employed by at least one law school—the University of 
Michigan Law School—is the “secret straw vote.”  Under this system, the eligible faculty vote 
 
177 E-mail from Darryll Jones, Associate Dean of Academic Affairs, University of Pittsburgh School of Law, to 
Adrienne Belyea, Washington College of Law (Oct. 11, 2005, 16:00:09 EST) (on file with author).  Dean Jones 
further discussed how the policy was first implemented out of concern for untenured faculty members; however, a 
number of secret ballots have been requested and there is no way to determine whether these requests have come 
from tenured or untenured faculty.  Id.  
178 E-mail from law professor who requested anonymity, to Ira P. Robbins, Washington College of Law (Dec. 8, 
2005, 20:05:21 EST) (on file with author). 
179 See Appendix C. 
180 See id.
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by secret ballot, the dean announces the results of that secret vote, discussions continue, and then 
the final governing vote is taken in the open.181 
Finally, whether based on policy,182 tradition183 or varying governance structure,184 some 
law schools continue to use an open voting system for all faculty decisions.185 Indeed, on a 
motion for a secret ballot at a recent faculty meeting on hiring, one law school dean is reported to 
have said, “A secret ballot is anti-democratic!”186 
181 See id. 
182 See, e.g., E-mail from Mayer Freed, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Curriculum, Northwestern 
University School of Law, to Adrienne Belyea, Washington College of Law (Sept. 16, 2005, 15:32:10 EST) (on file 
with author) (“Our tenure and promotion procedures provide explicitly for an open ballot.”). 
183 See, e.g., E-mail from Margaret Currin, Associate Dean, Campbell University, Norman Adrian Wiggins School 
of Law, to Adrienne Belyea, Washington College of Law (Oct. 14, 2005, 12:48:35 EST) (on file with author) (“We 
don’t have a policy disallowing secret ballots or speaking to them at all.  To date, we have never used a secret ballot 
for hiring decisions.”); E-mail from Mayer Freed, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Curriculum, 
Northwestern University School of Law, to Adrienne Belyea, Washington College of Law (Sept. 16, 2005, 15:32:10 
EST) (on file with author) (“There is nothing written regarding hiring decisions, but there is a strong tradition of 
open voting.”); E-mail from Steven Goode, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, The University of Texas School 
of Law, to Adrienne Belyea, Washington College of Law (Sept. 16, 2005, 12:07:29 EST) (on file with author) (“We 
do not use secret ballots and have not for the 28 years that I have been here.”); E-mail from Alan Weinberger, 
Associate Dean for Faculty, Saint Louis University School of Law, to Adrienne Belyea, Washington College of Law 
(Sept. 21, 2005, 00:08:31 EST) (on file with author) (“Saint Louis University School of Law does not use secret 
ballots for hiring, promotion or tenure decisions.  Hiring decisions are made by open ballot at faculty meetings.  
Promotion and tenure decisions are made by open ballot at meetings of the Personnel Committee, consisting of all 
full professors.”). 
184 DUDERSTADT, supra note 58, at 139; see, e.g., E-mail from Carol Mon Lee, Associate Dean, University of 
Hawaii at Manoa-William S. Richardson School of Law, to Adrienne Belyea, Washington College of Law (Oct. 10, 
2005, 16:34:01 EST) (on file with author) (“Answers [to the secret ballot questionnaire] pertain to hiring only—
tenure is done by committee.”). 
185 E-mail from James E. Ryan, Academic Associate Dean, University of Virginia School of Law, to Sima P. 
Bhakta, Washington College of Law (Mar. 17, 2005, 11:13:45 EST) (on file with author) (“I don't know of any 
provisions that require or even permit secret balloting.  I don’t think we have any formal provisions on this issue at 
all; as a general norm, we do not vote secretly, either in committee or on the floor at faculty meetings.”); E-mail 
from Michael Klausner, Associate Dean for Research and Academics, Stanford Law School, to Sima P. Bhakta, 
Washington College of Law (Mar. 17, 2005, 10:59:56 EST) (on file with author) (stating that there are no explicit 
provisions in the rules that permit secret ballot voting).  Dean Klausner also noted that a faculty member’s request 
for a secret ballot would likely not be granted.  Id.  E-mail from Richard Briffault, Vice-Dean, Columbia Law 
School, to Sima P. Bhakta, Washington College of Law (Apr. 6, 2005, 12:13:23 EST) (on file with author) (noting 
that Columbia uses “open voting (and no absentee voting) on personnel decisions, such as hiring of faculty and 
promotion to tenure, and all other faculty decisions”).  However, the faculty of Columbia Law School does use a 
secret ballot when electing members of the appointments committee and in recommending a candidate for dean of 
central administration.  Id.  
186 Why did you look down here?  You don’t really expect me to disclose the name of the professor or the law 
school, do you?  E-mail from law professor who requested anonymity, to Ira P. Robbins, Washington College of 
Law (Sept. 16, 2005, 10:18:25 EST) (on file with author). 
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Like the University of Maryland, however, law schools employing an open ballot system 
should at the very least permit faculty members to make a secret ballot request, and better yet, a 
confidential request as the University of Pittsburgh allows.  Schools that do not have provisions 
detailing how voting should take place should adopt a policy following Robert’s Rules of 
Order,187 according to which a faculty member has an opportunity to assert that the vote take 
place by secret ballot.188 Under Robert’s Rules, when a faculty member makes such a request, 
the faculty would vote—by secret ballot—to determine if the vote on the issue at hand should be 
decided by secret ballot.189 A better and less complicated policy would be to adopt the practice 
whereby the faculty complies with the request without a separate vote, to maintain the valued 
and existing respect among faculty members.190 In either case, the importance of maintaining 
good relations and honest votes among colleagues necessitates the need either to follow a strict 
secret ballot policy or a viable modification thereof (such as a signed ballot that is not revealed 
unless there is a lawsuit or investigation) for all faculty personnel decisions, or to grant a faculty 
member’s confidential secret ballot request on a particular issue. 
B.  The Numbers 
187 See HENRY M. ROBERT ET AL., ROBERT’S RULES OF ORDER (Perseus, Newly Revised 10th ed. 2000).  See also E-
mail from Ivy Broder, Dean of Academic Affairs, American University, to Sima P. Bhakta, Washington College of 
Law (Mar. 17, 2005, 11:24:43 EST) (on file with author) (noting that, where the regulations are silent on secret 
ballot provisions, Robert’s Rules of Order should govern requests for secret ballot); E-mail from Enid Trucios-
Haynes, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, University of Louisville-Louis D. Brandeis School of Law, to 
Adrienne Belyea, Washington College of Law (Dec. 7, 2005, 14:11:57 EST) (on file with author) (“The Brandeis 
School of Law at the University of Louisville does not have a written policy regarding secret ballots in its promotion 
and tenure documents.”). 
188 See ROBERT ET AL., supra note 187, § 30, at 274 (“A member who believes that a secret vote will give a truer 
expression of the assembly’s will can move that the vote on the motion be taken by ballot.”).  
189 See id. § 45, at 398 (“Except as may otherwise be provided by the bylaws, a vote by ballot can be ordered by a 
majority vote—which may be desirable in any case where it is believed that members may thereby be more likely to 
vote their true sentiments.”).  Moreover, “[w]hen the bylaws require a vote to be taken by ballot, this requirement 
cannot be suspended, even by a unanimous vote.”  Id. at 398-99.  In addition, “[a] motion to make unanimous a 
ballot vote that was not unanimous is out of order, unless that motion is also voted on by ballot—since any member 
who openly votes against declaring the first vote unanimous will thereby reveal that he did not vote for the 
prevailing choice.”  Id. at 399. 
190 See infra note 198. 
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 As previously noted,191 I sent questionnaires to law school deans, associate deans, and 
professors requesting information about voting practices for hiring, retention, promotion, tenure, 
and dean selection.  I received responses from 165 (of 168) AALS member schools (98%) and 
20 (of 22) non-member schools (91%)—a 97% overall response (185/190).  Only five law 
schools—two AALS members192 and three non-members193—did not respond to my main 
survey. 
 Significantly, 88% of U.S. law schools responding (163/185) use a secret ballot for one 
or more categories of personnel decisions.  (The figure is 89%  for AALS member schools 
(147/165) and 80%  for non-member schools (16/20).)194 For faculty personnel decisions alone 
(hiring, retention, promotion, or tenure), 83%  of law schools (153/185) use a secret ballot.  (The 
figure is 84%  for member schools (138/165) and 75% for non-member schools (15/20).)  Only 
7%  of U.S. law schools (10/145) use a secret ballot for dean selection only and not for any other 
decision regarding faculty personnel.195 
Separated into the various decisions on faculty personnel, the following results emerge:  
76% of law schools (141/185) use secret ballots for faculty hiring (76% of member schools 
(126/185) and 75% of non-member schools (15/20)).  Of those law schools, 99% use completely 
secret ballots (139/141—98% of member schools (124/126) and 100% of non-member schools 
(15/15)).  Secret ballots must be signed at 4% of law schools (5/141—4% of member schools 
 
191 See supra notes 3-6 and accompanying text. 
192 These schools are:  University of Detroit Mercy School of Law; University of Puerto Rico School of Law; and St. 
Thomas University School of Law. 
193 These schools are:  North Carolina Central University School of Law and Pontifical Catholic University of 
Puerto Rico School of Law. 
194 All percentages in this section are based on the number of schools responding in the particular category, as not all 
schools responded in all categories. 
195 All figures in this section are rounded to the nearest percent. 
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(5/126) and 0% of non-member schools (0/15)).196 Only 1% of law schools (2/141) require 
reasons along with the submission of secret ballots.  (The figure is 2% for member schools 
(2/126) and 0% for non-member schools (0/15).)  Secret ballots for hiring decisions are 
automatic197 at 94% of law schools that use secret ballots in this category (132/141—93% of 
member schools (117/126) and 100% of non-member schools (15/15)). 
 For faculty retention decisions, the figures are as follows:  67% of law schools (105/157) 
use secret ballots (69% of member schools (95/137) and 50% of non-member schools (10/20)).  
Of those law schools, 98% use completely secret ballots (103/105—98% of member schools 
(93/95) and 100% of non-member schools (10/10)).  Secret ballots must be signed at 5% of law 
schools (5/105—5% of member schools (5/95) and 0% of non-member schools (0/10)).  Five 
percent of law schools (5/105) require reasons along with the submission of secret ballots.  (The 
figure is 4% for member schools (4/95) and 10% for non-member schools (1/10).)  Secret ballots 
for faculty retention decisions are automatic at 93% of law schools that use secret ballots in this 
category (98/105—93% of member schools (88/95) and 100% of non-member schools (10/10)). 
 The results for faculty promotion decisions are:  70% of law schools (124/176) use secret 
ballots (73% of member schools (114/156) and 50% of non-member schools (10/20)).  Of those 
law schools, 95% use completely secret ballots (118/124—96% of member schools (109/114) 
and 90% of non-member schools (9/10)).  Secret ballots must be signed at 6% of law schools 
(8/124—6% of member schools (7/114) and 10% of non-member schools (1/10)).  Five percent 
of law schools (6/124) require reasons along with the submission of secret ballots.  (The figure is 
5% for member schools (6/114) and 0% for non-member schools (0/10).)  Secret ballots for 
 
196 At first glance, the figures in this sentence may appear to be at odds with those in the previous sentence.  
However, a school that requires that secret ballots be signed may still have a system that is completely secret if a 
double-blind procedure is used. 
197 That is, there is no necessity for a voting member to make a motion for a secret ballot. 
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faculty promotion decisions are automatic at 92% of law schools that use secret ballots in this 
category (114/124—91% of member schools (104/114) and 100% of non-member schools 
(10/10)). 
 For faculty tenure decisions, the figures are as follows:  74% of law schools (132/178) 
use secret ballots (77% of member schools (121/158) and 55% of non-member schools (11/20)).  
Of those law schools, 95% use completely secret ballots (126/132—95% of member schools 
(115/121) and 100% of non-member schools (11/11)).  Secret ballots must be signed at 7% of 
law schools (9/132—7% of member schools (8/121) and 9% of non-member schools (1/11)).  
Five percent of law schools (7/132) require reasons along with the submission of secret ballots.  
(The figure is 6% for member schools (7/121) and 0% for non-member schools (0/11).)  Secret 
ballots for faculty tenure decisions are automatic at 92% of law schools that use secret ballots in 
this category (122/132—92% of member schools (111/121) and 100% of non-member schools 
(11/11)). 
 The results for dean selection are:  83% of law schools (118/142) use secret ballots (85% 
of member schools (106/125) and 71% of non-member schools (12/17)).  Of those law schools, 
95% use completely secret ballots (112/118—95% of member schools (101/106) and 92% of 
non-member schools (11/12)).  Secret ballots must be signed at 3% of law schools (3/118—3% 
of member schools (3/106) and 0% of non-member schools (0/12)).  Three percent of law 
schools (3/118) require reasons along with the submission of secret ballots.  (The figure is 2% 
for member schools (2/106) and 8% for non-member schools (1/12).)  Secret ballots for faculty 
dean-selection decisions are automatic at 85% of law schools that use secret ballots in this 
category (100/118—85% of member schools (90/106) and 83% of non-member schools (10/12)). 
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 Finally, 87% of law schools (82/94) use secret ballots on other—i.e., non-faculty-
personnel—decisions (87% of member schools (74/85) and 89% of non-member schools 
(8/9)).198 
C.  Discussion 
Some of the results of this study stand out in a striking way.  For example, most law 
schools in the United States use secret ballots for decisions involving faculty personnel and dean 
selection.  The most common pattern in every category—hiring, retention, promotion, tenure, 
and dean selection—is that law faculties automatically use a completely secret ballot that is 
unsigned and that does not require a statement of reasons.199 
Other results may require some explanation or further investigation.  For example, 
respondents at some law schools wrote that they did not understand my question, “Does your 
faculty use secret ballots for faculty retention decisions?,” or that it was not applicable at their 
schools.  The reason is that, after an initial hire, faculty at some schools do not vote for 
reappointment (e.g., annually or biennially) other than when the candidate comes up for 
promotion or tenure.  Thus, the number of schools that indicated use of secret ballots for 
retention (105) was significantly lower than the number that indicated use of secret ballots for 
hiring (141), promotion (124), or tenure (132).  Nevertheless, the percentage of schools that use 
secret ballots for retention (67%) is not significantly different from the percentage that use secret 
ballots in the other categories (76% for hiring, 70% for promotion, and 74% for tenure). 
 
198 These decisions include, for example:  election to particular committees, such as a faculty executive committee 
(Illinois) or a dean’s advisory committee (Nevada-Las Vegas); student petitions for readmission following academic 
disqualification (North Dakota, Texas Tech); recipients of certain awards (West Virginia, Southern); curriculum 
reform (San Francisco).  More generally, many respondents added that that their schools also use secret ballots for 
sensitive or controversial decisions, as well as whenever a voting member of the faculty requests a secret ballot.  See 
Appendix C.  As a matter of courtesy to the requesting faculty member, faculty at some schools will accede to that 
request without requiring a motion or a vote (e.g., Arkansas, Colorado, Denver, Louisville, Loyola-New Orleans, 
Texas Tech).  See id.
199 See Appendix A; Appendix B. 
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 More law schools use secret ballots for dean selection (83%) than for any other category 
of decisions involving faculty personnel.  Yet, while the percentage is still high, use of secret 
ballots for dean selection is automatic less often (85%) than it is an all other categories (94% for 
hiring, 93% for retention, 92% for promotion, and 92% for tenure).  I suspect that that the 
reasons are at least threefold:  First, although a strong argument can be made for secret ballots in 
either situation, law schools are much more likely to use secret ballots automatically when the 
dean search involves at least one internal candidate that when all of the candidates are external.  
Second, law school dean search committees are typically controlled by and are largely appointed 
by university officials.  The committees’ procedures, therefore, are determined by the university 
administration, and not by the law school faculty.  Third, dean searches occur with much less 
frequency than the other faculty personnel decisions discussed in this Article.  From one dean 
search to another, therefore, procedures at a school can vary greatly. 
 There are some variables that I did not consider when I drafted and distributed my 
questionnaires.  One of these is university governance structures.  While at most law schools 
voting procedures are within the discretion of the law school faculty, at some schools university-
wide rules govern.  For instance, at some schools at which the law faculty uses secret ballots for 
hiring, they do not vote at all on promotion and tenure; that determination is made by a 
university committee.200 
Nor did I consider the relationship between the use of secret ballots and whether a law 
school was public or private.  It may be, for example, that—in states that have open-meetings 
laws—faculty at public universities are not permitted to vote by secret ballot. 
 
200 Similarly, at some law schools faculty play only a limited role in dean selection. 
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 In addition, I did not initially consider the relationship between a law school’s ranking in 
the U.S. News & World Report annual ranking201 and its use of secret ballots.  When I tabulated 
the final responses in Appendix B, however, I was struck by the following discrepancy:  8 of the 
top 10 law schools in the U.S. generally do not use secret ballots.202 Yet the vast majority of law 
schools in the country—including 7 out of the next 11203 schools—generally do use secret 
ballots.204 Others may wish to speculate about the reasons for this apparent anomaly. 
 Another observation is that, although the use of secret ballots for faculty hiring is similar 
at AALS member (76%) and non-member (75%) schools, at non-member schools the use of 
secret ballots is far less in the other categories:  retention—69% member schools; 50% non-
member schools; promotion—73% member schools; 50% non-member schools; tenure—77% 
member schools; 55% non-member schools; dean selection—85% member schools; 71% non-
member schools.  My sense is that the explanation has to do in large part with the newness of a 
school.  While it is not invariably the case, many non-member law schools are relatively new 
and, therefore, have not gone through the necessary maturation process for enough retentions, 
promotions, tenures, and dean selections to have established fixed procedures. 
 I would be remiss if I did not point out the following limitation of this study:  Many 
faculty—and even some members of the administration—expressed some uncertainty about their 
school’s precise rules and practices.  Thus, administrators and faculty at some schools may not 
agree with the descriptions of the secret-ballot procedures (or lack thereof) that one or more of 
 
201 See America’s Best Graduate Schools 2007, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Apr. __, 2006, at 44. 
202 These schools are: Yale, Stanford, Columbia, Chicago, Pennsylvania, UC-Berkeley, Michigan, and Virginia.  
(Columbia and Pennsylvania do use secret ballots for dean selection.)  The two schools that generally do use secret 
ballots are Harvard and NYU. 
203 I consider the next 11 schools, rather than 10, because there was a three-way tie for number 19. 
204 These schools are:  Cornell, Georgetown, UCLA, USC, Vanderbilt, George Washington, and Washington 
University.  The four schools that generally do not use secret ballots are:  Duke, Northwestern, Texas, and 
Minnesota.  (Duke does not use secret ballots for hiring, retention, or dean selection, but does use secret ballots for 
promotion and tenure.  Minnesota does not use secret ballots for hiring or retention, but does use secret ballots for 
promotion, tenure, and dean selection.) 
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their colleagues provided to me.  Indeed, some faculty members had longer institutional 
memories than others (or than their deans).  Others disagreed on nuances of their school’s 
practices.  When I encountered inconsistent or conflicting responses, I contacted the respondents 
for clarification.  Moreover, if I received only one response from a school (typically from the 
dean or an associate dean), I did not write to others at the school for confirmation.205 It may be 
that, had I done so, I would have seen some deviations.  Finally, of course, just because I may 
have received two (or more) consistent responses from a school does not necessarily mean that 
another colleague at the same school would have agreed. 
 Notwithstanding the foregoing explanations, anomalies, speculations, and limitations—
some or all of which others may wish to pursue—the point remains that most law schools use 
secret ballots for most faculty personnel decisions. 
CONCLUSION 
The secret ballot, which originated in Australia, dates back more than 150 years.  Since 
then, both the public and private sectors have implemented the procedure and argue that it is 
grounded in basic principles of democracy.  Initially, the United States adopted the Australian 
ballot to dispel corruption within the electoral political process.  Similarly, universities adopted 
the system as a means to enforce fairness and encourage honesty within the collegiate 
environment.   To be sure, political elections do not provide a perfect analogy to voting in 
academia, because voters in political elections are permitted to use purely personal, irrational, or 
discriminatory bases for their votes.  The intimidation factor in both contexts is palpable, 
however, and the secret ballot emerged as a workable solution to the problems that occurred in 
those contexts.  Academic institutions recognized that the secret ballot system protected and 
 
205 Also, not all respondents answers all questions.  In many cases, I followed up with a request for additional 
information.  Many, but not all, respondents complied. 
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furthered university goals while eliminating the unjustified influence of deans and higher ranking 
faculty members and allowing individuals to vote their conscience.   
 In this Article, I argue that all law schools, as highly democratic institutions, should seek 
to adopt a secret ballot voting system for faculty personnel decisions—those pertaining to hiring, 
retention, promotion, and tenure—in order to ensure candid and voluntary assessments at every 
level of the faculty evaluation process.  Because faculty personnel decisions can be exceedingly 
sensitive and are among the most important questions that come before the faculty, law schools 
should employ secret ballot voting systems for these matters.  A substantial majority—88%—of 
law schools in the United States already do use secret ballots for one or more categories of 
faculty personnel decisions.  But many law schools do not, and some that do for some purposes 
might consider going further. 
 In a perfect world, of course, we would not need secret ballots at all.  Faculty would trust 
one another, faculty and administrators would not hunt for others’ ulterior motives where none 
may exist, discussions would be courteous and honest, and voting would be fair and unbiased.  
But we do not operate in such a world.  In the imperfect world in which we do operate, it may 
well be true that, with secret ballots, someone may vote “no” for inappropriate reasons (e.g., 
bias, discrimination).  It is equally true, however—and perhaps even more so—that, with open 
ballots, someone may vote “yes” for inappropriate reasons (e.g., political correctness, 
sycophancy, fear of reprisals).  It is critical to recognize that votes can be disguised in either type 
of system.   
 It is also critical to recognize that different law schools have different personalities, 
different cultures, and different climates of trust and respect.  Not only do schools vary in these 
ways from other schools, but these factors are also dynamic and vary within schools over time—
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particularly, although not exclusively, when there is a change of administration.  So the foremost 
criterion that faculty members should constantly address is this:  which system of voting at this 
school at this time will lead to votes that best reflect this faculty’s good faith collective judgment 
on the merits.  At schools that cannot have a sincere and civil discussion about whether to use a 
secret ballot, whether generally or on a specific question, secret ballots should clearly be used. 
 With secret ballots—or, at the very least, with an open and honest debate about whether 
to conduct secret ballots—may come not only candor, but also greater harmony and 
collegiality.206 
APPENDICES 
[Note: Appendices are currently in pdf form and can be sent to you by fax email attachment, 
upon request.  Thank you.] 
 
206 If the secret ballot is good for hiring and other faculty personnel decisions, it could also be an essential procedure 
for other faculty decisions—some of which can be at least as divisive.  While some responses to my questionnaire 
addressed this matter, see supra note 198; Appendix C, and many of the arguments discussed herein would be 
equally applicable, that issue is beyond the direct scope of this Article. 
